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ABSTRACT 
Governmental industrial policies have significant influence on industrial 
performance. Many developing countries that lack capital and a good technology base 
use foreign direct investment (FDI)-dependent governmental policies to induce 
multinational corporations (MNCs) to invest in their indigenous immature industries. In 
this article, the Chinese automotive industry, which is regulated directly under the 
Chinese central government, is used to illustrate the interactions between the complex 
FDI-dependent governmental policies and the industrial development of developing 
countries. According to changes in Chinese automotive industry policy, the Chinese auto 
industry’s development process is divided into four phases: extremely passive FDI-
dependent policy phase, partial strategic FDI-dependent policy phase, ISI restructuring 
phase, and industrial upgrading phase. Considering those four phases, the overall 
industrial characteristics and policies of China’s automotive industry are introduced and 
analyzed. Then, a systematic analysis is carried out to explore the key reasons for the 
policy failure and distortion. The results indicate the successful application of FDI-
dependent industrial policies is subject to numerous conditions, such as the content of 
policies, policy implementation, and the economic environment of a country. In the end, 
a few policy recommendations, including reforming the ownership structure of state-
owned enterprises, promoting mergers and acquisitions between inefficient firms in order 
to attract high-quality investment from MNCs, etc., are proposed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the global economy, governments play a significant role in protecting 
their local economies and promoting industrial development. Multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) industrial policies are the main instruments 
governments use to intervene in industrial evolution.  
Those governmental policies include: trade policies (e.g., tariffs, quotas, and other 
antidumping measures) that aim to protect the weak local market from foreign 
competition; support polices (e.g., tax incentives, subsidies, preferential loans, licenses, 
and government contracts) designed to promote the development of domestic companies; 
and foreign investment policies (e.g., joint venture regulations and local content rules) 
that seek to enhance production capacity, increase employment, and transfer technology 
know-how to foster linkages between indigenous markets and the global marketplace. 
The forms of industrial policies vary across countries, but they mainly focus on two 
purposes: protection and development.  
MNC- and FDI-related industrial policies have been successfully used around the 
world, such as in Japan and Korea, which employed infant-industry protection in their 
automotive industries. Although the advocates of the “free-trade” principle criticized 
these policies, Japan and Korea were able to obtain fast economic growth and increased 
development capability in the 1950s. However, this type of success did not happen in 
every country. Many less developed countries in Latin America and Africa failed to 
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achieve their industrial goals using industrial policy patterns similar to those used in East 
Asian countries. 
The Chinese automotive industry has been protected and regulated by the Chinese 
government through a comprehensive set of industrial policies for over 30 years. In this 
thesis, by examining the case of China’s automotive industry since the 1980s, we try to 
demonstrate the internal relationships between government policy and industrial 
development as well as the interactions between government and industry. In line with 
changes in Chinese automotive industry policy as well as the characteristics of two 
related industrial development theories, the Chinese auto industry’s development process 
has been divided into four phases. During the first phase, “extremely passive FDI-
dependent policy” (1978–1994), China’s economic opening and reforms stimulated a 
rapid growth of demand for vehicles while the production system that had been built 
largely for defense purposes was unable to satisfy the new demand. China had 
insufficient location advantages, so the government’s role should be mainly providing 
basic infrastructure and the upgrade of the economy’s human capital to attract MNCs and 
FDI. The second phase is “partial strategic FDI-dependent policy” (1994–2001). This 
phase is a natural development of the first one. There was a veritable flood of investment 
into the Chinese auto industry during this stage. It resulted in a rapid increase of cars in 
total vehicle production. The FDI was mainly in the primary commodities and natural 
resources sectors amid a lack of created assets1 endowment. The third phase is “kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 They differ from natural assets because, while these refer to physical assets of a country, such as 
natural resources, climate. or geographical situation, created assets imply a previous use of resources for an 
improvement of the development degree of a country. They are intangible, gathering technological or 
human capital resources. 
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import-substituting industry (ISI) restructuring policy” (2001–2007). China entered the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and nearly all the major international 
carmakers entered the Chinese automotive market. Tariffs, quota, and importation 
limitations should be cancelled under WTO rules, but the Chinese didn’t want to practice 
free trade and still tried to protect inefficient SOEs and local carmakers with some 
industrial policies that were against WTO rules. On the other hand, with the trade benefit 
brought by WTO rules, car exports started growing in China. The main agents were 
domestic firms, and in other undeveloped or developing countries, they were MNCs. The 
last is the “industrial upgrading policy” (2008–present) phase, during which the WTO 
forced the Chinese central government to put auto industrial policies in line with its rules. 
Hence, China started to think about upgrading its industrial policies. 
The key factors that determine the success or failure of the Chinese auto industry 
are the research focuses. The success of industrial policies highly depends not only on the 
content of policies, but also on the policy implementation and the economic and political 
environment in a specific country. Therefore, three aspects should be considered in this 
study: the Chinese government, the automotive industry, and the volatile global economic 
environment. An economic system that is totally controlled by the Chinese government 
gives the Chinese government greater power to intervene in industrial development 
processes of the Chinese automotive industry. From 1978 to 2001, research mainly 
focused on government policy and its effect on industrial development. In 2001, China 
joined the WTO, and an increasing number of MNCs invested in the auto industry. All 
those changes created a different economic environment for the Chinese automotive 
industry. During this period, besides the FDI-oriented government policy, the economic 
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and political environment in China is considered a key factor in industrial evolution. 
Thus, in order to explore those key factors and gain a deep insight into the case study, the 
questions listed below will be answered in the research.  
We start by exploring the Chinese automotive industry policy strategy and trying 
to figure out which part of the policy was successful and which part has failed in the real 
world. Then we explore the main reasons for the inefficiency of China’s automobile 
industry policies. Does the failure imply the deficit of the theory of FDI? What are the 
key factors that determine the success and failures?  
All those answers will provide information about the evolution and development 
of the auto industry in China, further shed some light on the possible role of the state in 
promoting the development of a particular industry, and illustrate how the process of 
industrialization may take place with aid from the state.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part introduces the general effect of 
MNCs and foreign direct investment (FDI), which include multinationals and foreign 
trade, multinationals and domestic firms’ productivity, multinationals and market 
structure, as well as FDI and economic growth. This part can help us have a general idea 
about the current research on MNCs and FDI. The second part is the introduction of 
Dunning’s “eclectic paradigm,” which includes five development phases, depending on 
the level of GDP and net outward investment (NOI). The third part is the introduction of 
Sanjaya Lall’s “theory of FDI utilization,” which includes four types of government 
policy interventions on MNCs: passive FDI-dependent policy, strategic FDI-dependent 
policy, ISI restructuring policy, and autonomous policy. Dunning and Lall both illustrate 
a dynamic framework in their theories. We will apply their theories to the case study and 
try to help the Chinese auto industry achieve progress step-by-step.  
Empirical Literature Reviews on the Effects of MNCs and FDI 
In order to find proper theories to help us analyze our case study (the Chinese 
automobile industry), a concise but comprehensive review and evaluation of the existing 
empirical literature will be discussed in this part. Generally speaking, literature that 
relates to MNCs and FDI is fragmented. Therefore, we summarize those empirical 
literatures in four categories: MNCs and foreign trade, MNCs and domestic firms’ 
productivity, MNCs and market structure, as well as FDI and economic growth. 
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MNCs and Foreign Trade 
It is difficult to find out whether MNCs tend to generate trade surpluses or trade 
deficits in the host economy. On the one hand, FDI inflows may reduce or increase 
imports received by the host country. There is evidence for both cases (Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 1997; Goldberg and Klein, 1999; Blonigen, 2001 and Swenson, 2003). Lipsey 
and Weiss (1981; 1984) find a positive relationship between FDI and imports but fail to 
think about endogeneity stemming from the characteristics of the host market. Bajo-
Rubio and Montero-Munoz (2001), having corrected for endogeneity, also find a positive 
relationship, but Gruber and Mutti (1991), using similar data to Lipsey and Weiss (1981), 
find an insignificant negative relationship between FDI and imports. On the other hand, 
more evidence exists regarding the idea that FDI inflows increase exports of the host 
economy (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Lipsey, 2002; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). 
The relationship between FDI and trade is related to the predominance of vertical 
or horizontal MNCs. Markusen (2002) states that the weight of empirical evidence 
suggests the dominance of horizontal motives for foreign production. He defends this 
idea for the world, because most FDI flows are among developed economies, which, 
according to his view, tend to be horizontal. However, Markusen also acknowledges that 
vertically integrated firms are important in some industries and surely important in some 
host countries. Hanson (2003) has obtained robust evidence for the importance of vertical 
MNCs and gives a reason they find strong evidence of vertical FDI. This is because they 
use microlevel data on foreign affiliates, whereas previous work uses data that aggregate 
not just across the activities of a given affiliate but also across all affiliates. 
	  7 
MNCs and Domestic Firms’ Productivity 
One of the most studied effects of FDI is that of spillovers. Many studies of 
spillovers have focused on whether this transference of new technologies from MNCs 
affects domestic firms’ productivity. In this respect, the results are fairly ambiguous. On 
the one hand, some computable general equilibrium models report that FDI inflows raise 
welfare by increasing the number of varieties available for consumers (Bchir et al., 2001 
and Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). And there are advanced techniques and know-how that 
MNCs bring to host countries. This may be transferred to domestic firms voluntarily 
through the creation of linkages or licensing agreements with domestic firms, or 
involuntarily through imitation or labor mobility. Haskel (2002) obtains evidence of 
positive horizontal spillovers in the United Kingdom. But these positive spillovers do not 
seem to be large enough to justify the amount of money spent by the government to 
attract MNCs. Smarzynska (2004) finds positive spillovers through backward linkages 
and no evidence for horizontal spillover in Lithuania. This indicates that vertical 
spillovers may be more likely than horizontal ones. On the other hand, Djankov and 
Hoekman (2000) find a negative effect of the presence of MNCs on domestic firms in the 
Czech Republic. Aitken and Harrison (1999) find evidence for negative spillovers on 
domestic firms’ productivity in Venezuela. FDI reduces the output of those firms, which 
makes them produce in less efficient points of their declining average cost curve, thus 
reducing their productivity. Grog and Greenaway (2004), Barba Navaretti and Venables 
(2004), and Crespo and Fontoura (2007) state a vague, and even negative evidence of 
MNCs effects on domestic firms’ productivity. 
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MNCs and Market Structure 
Theoretical predictions about the effect of FDI on market structure are consistent 
with both a pro-competitive effect and a more concentrated structure (Ferrett, 2004). Pro-
competitive effect indicates that MNCs promote competition and reduce the price-cost 
markup, while a more concentrated structure indicates the MNCs crowd out (less 
efficient) domestic firms with the danger of turning the market into a more oligopolistic 
structure. Markusen and Venable (1998, 2000) show that the type of firm (MNCs versus 
domestic) that prevails will depend on the relative endowments and size of countries, the 
level of transport costs, and firm-level and plant-level economies of scale. Therefore, in 
the end, whether MNCs crowd out domestic firms is an empirical matter (Barba Navaretti 
and Venables, 2004). 
FDI and Economic Growth 
MNCs often possess higher skills and experience, exhibit more advanced 
techniques, have high levels of R&D expenditures, etc. These characteristics lead to 
thinking about the role of MNCs as promoters of technological innovation and progress 
and, therefore, economic growth. There are many empirical case studies to support that 
idea. Obadan (1992) discovered a positive, statistically significant relationship between 
economic growth and the FDI inflow. In his study of the Nigerian economy for the period 
1973–1990, it was observed that the economy grows at an average rate of 1.85% per 
annum. Campos and Kinoshita (2002) examined the effects of FDI on growth for the 
period 1990–1998 for the 25 Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 
transition economies. In these countries, FDI was a pure technology transfer. The main 
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results indicate that FDI had a significant positive effect on economic growth of each 
selected country.  
However, given the intangible nature of these assets it may be difficult to 
empirically grasp their effect on growth. The results of empirical studies indicate that FDI 
increases growth when host economy characteristics point to the existence of an 
“absorptive capacity.” What exactly constitutes that absorptive capacity varies. It may be 
related to high-income-level countries (Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan, 1994), an open 
trade regime (Balasubraanyam, 1996), a highly educated workforce (Borensztein, 1998, 
Campos and Kinoshita, 2002) or well-developed financial markets (Alfaro, 2004; 2006). 
An exception to this positive relationship is the study by Carkovic and Levine (2005). 
Using a panel for 72 economies over the period 1960–1995 they find no evidence that 
FDI flows have an impact on GDP growth. However, using the same methodology in an 
analysis for a group of developed and homogeneous economies, Bajo-Rubio (2008) 
found a clear positive impact of FDI on growth.  
The study of MNCs and FDI has been a fertile research topic, and a number of 
authors have devoted their efforts to review the literature. We find that this is a very 
fragmented area of the literature, in which there are dispersed contributions and different 
strands according to the particular effect of MNCs analyzed. In this circumstance, the 
effects of MNCs have been very much debated, and there is still some controversy 
regarding their impact on host economies. Therefore, it seems difficult to obtain an 
economy-wide evaluation of their impact.  
Also, empirical literature reviews are aimed to evaluate the effects of MNCs and 
FDI on host countries, while few studies analyze how countries use policies to influence 
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MNCs’ investment activities and then achieve industrial development. In spite of that, 
few empirical studies are related to the effect of MNCs and FDI on those developing 
countries in Asia, which have different cultures and economic environments from 
European countries. Even though empirical literature analyzing how developing countries 
in Asia use policies to influence MNCs’ investment activities is rather scarce, we find 
them. Dunning’s (1997, 1979, 2000) “eclectic paradigm” and Sanjaya Lall’s “theory of 
FDI utilization” are a good fit for our case study. 
Eclectic Paradigm 
In eclectic paradigm theory, Dunning provides a triad of conditions necessary for 
a firm to become a MNC. He points out ownership advantage, location advantage, and 
internalization advantage as three key determinants that a firm should look into upon 
entering the market. Ownership advantage suggests that a firm must possess specific 
advantages that make it strong enough to compete with local firms. This can also be 
regarded as competitive or monopolistic advantage. Location advantage is the idea that 
for a MNC to establish a new plant in a foreign country, this country must have some 
advantages compared to the home country of the MNC. These advantages may be 
cheaper factors of production, better access to natural resources, a bigger market, etc. 
Finally, internalization is the degree of control over foreign affiliate that is higher through 
FDI than licensing a local firm. So it suggests a firm exploit its ownership advantages 
within its subsidiaries rather than sell or license them to other local firms. 
The central concepts of the eclectic or OLI paradigm have also been introduced in 
a dynamic framework known as the investment development path (IDP). IDP relates the 
inward and outward direct investment position of countries with their corresponding 
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stages of development (Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Narula, 1996). According to this 
theoretical framework, countries tend to go through five development phases. Each of the 
stages links the GDP level and the country’s net outward investment (NOI) position, 
defined as the difference between outward direct investment stock and inward direct 
investment stock. 
 
Figure 1. The pattern of the investment development path. Source: Dunning and Narula 
(1996). 
According to the pattern of the IDP in Figure 1, the first phase of the IDP refers to 
the least-developed countries that face a negative NOI position; because they are net FDI 
receivers, they mostly take advantage of the country’s natural resources. On the other 
hand, outward FDI is negligible or nonexistent. The second phase is a natural 
development of the first one. The NOI position decreases because of an increase inflow 
of FDI, even faster than the GDP growth, while outward investment remains low or 
negligible. The third phase includes the so-called emerging countries. They exhibit a 
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growing NOI position due to an increased rate of growth of outward FDI and a gradual 
slowdown of inward FDI. Phase four is distinguished by a shift to a positive NOI 
position, as outward FDI stock exceeds inward FDI stock. Finally, in the fifth phase, we 
find the most advanced countries, such as United States, Japan, or the United Kingdom, 
in which NOI position tends to fluctuate around zero while reflecting high levels of 
inward and outward FDI. 
According to Dunning and Narula (1996), the investment development path can 
be framed as follows. During the first stage, countries have insufficient location 
advantages, thus both inward and outward investments are extremely limited and the 
MNCs prefer to access these countries through trade as well as through entering into 
nonequity relationships with local firms. Under this situation, the government’s role 
should be mainly providing basic infrastructure and upgrading the economy’s human 
capital, through educational and training programs, as well as implementing import-
substitution and export-promotion policies that affect the structure of local markets and 
industries. During the second phase, as a country develops, the improvement of its 
locational advantages leads to a growth of inward FDI, especially in primary 
commodities and natural resources, as well as in industries that are intensive in physical 
capital and low-qualified work, i.e. sectors whose endowment of created assets are 
scarce. At this time, government policies may influence the process through incentives or 
tariffs, as the competitiveness of local firms at this stage is still very low and the outward 
FDI remains extremely low but larger than in the first stage. The third/intermediate phase 
shows an increase in the economy’s income per capita, an acceleration of 
industrialization, and a greater specialization of demand oriented towards superior-quality 
	  13 
products. Competition in the domestic market rises as the ownership advantages of the 
inward investors diffuse through the local industry. As a result, the domestic firms start 
developing their own advantages. The ownership advantages of local firms become 
increasingly associated with the property of intangible assets—so they less dependent on 
government polices—but the role of the government is still relevant and oriented towards 
a reduction of market failures and inefficient industries, as well as towards promoting an 
increasing integration of local and foreign companies, which minimizes the 
delocalization risks. The incentives policy should aim to attract FDI through activities in 
which local companies do not have competitive advantages as well as to stimulate 
domestic firms to exploit their own advantages in new markets. At the fourth stage, the 
country’s location advantages begin changing from cheap labor force and natural 
resources to created assets—sophisticated markets, qualified labor, technological capacity 
of the more dynamic sectors, and development of economies of agglomeration. The 
production processes are more capital-intensive, reflecting a lower cost of capital 
compared with the cost of labor. Concerning the role of the government, it has to ensure 
competition among national and foreign companies and suppress the existing market 
failures. In the fifth phase, the NOI stock becomes irrelevant as a result of the growing 
similarity between the most advanced countries. This means that the NOI will vary 
between a positive and a negative position, depending on the evolution of exchange rates 
and economic cycles, as well as on the firms’ individual strategies. As a result, FDI 
depends less on the condition of the host countries and more on the localization strategies 
of MNCs. Regarding the government, the role of government takes on a strategic 
dimension, increasingly behaving as an oligopoly with MNCs and other governments.  
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In synthesis, we can say that location advantages, including appropriate 
government policies and basic infrastructure, are particularly relevant in the first three 
stages of the IDP. The existence of a favorable institutional framework—which helps the 
development of ownership advantages in local firms, the increasing international mobility 
of operations, and the accumulation of technological and knowledge-intensive assets—
seems to constitute the acceleration factor of direct investment abroad and of the 
progression towards the fourth and fifth phases of development. 
Regarding the empirical part, Dunning, Kim, and Lin (2001) had Korea and 
Taiwan as a case study where the IDP concept was extended. According to them, the 
growth of trade and FDI is positively correlated with gross national product per capita 
and with the created asset intensity of products. 
Theory of FDI Utilization 
Sanjaya Lall (2003) argued the “theory of FDI utilization” in his book, 
Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, after exploring a panel of 
nine developing countries (China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Hong Kong) in East Asia over the period 1985–1998. The 
theory advocates that MNCs have advantages over immature domestic firms in 
management, production, engineering, design, distribution, marketing, etc. So inducing 
MNCs to invest in immature domestic industries in the developing countries can be a 
highly effective means of transferring technologies and building production capabilities 
in immature domestic firms.  
According to Lall’s argument, while MNCs can be a highly effective means of 
transferring technologies and building production capabilities, they may be less effective 
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in deepening and broadening them2. For example, MNCs initially transfer equipment and 
technologies suited to existing skills and capabilities. At this stage, they do invest in 
upgrading local skills, technological capabilities, and supply chains, but only to the extent 
that it is profitable in commercial terms (to implement production technologies). MNCs 
will go beyond this, but only if the skill base is growing, local suppliers are improving 
their capabilities, technology institutions can provide more advanced services, etc.3 
Moreover, the immature domestic firms in the developing countries have little chance to 
survive the competition of the MNCs, which offer high efficiency, high quality, and low 
price for similar products and services. All of these need active government policies. 
Thus, the key parts of the theory are to illustrate why and how to use government policies 
to induce and intervene in MNCs’ investment activities in order to foster the development 
of an immature industry. Overall, Lall points out that government policy interventions in 
MNCs are mainly four types (Lall, 2003).  
Passive FDI-dependent industrial policy is driven by FDI but relies largely on 
market forces to upgrade the structure. The main tools are a welcoming FDI regime, 
strong incentives for exports, good export infrastructure, and cheap, trainable labor. Skill 
upgrading and domestic technological activity are relatively neglected (although some 
countries have a relatively good base), and the domestic industrial sector tends to develop 
in isolation from the export sector.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p. 34, April 2003. 
3 Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p. 35, April 2003. 
4 Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p. 36, April 2003. 
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Passive strategies involve less industrial policy in export-oriented activities to 
start with (although there may be intervening in domestic-oriented activity). They need to 
evolve into more targeted strategies if countries are not to lose their competitive positions 
and momentum. 
1. Strategic FDI-dependent industrial policy is driven by FDI and exports 
within integrated production networks. There is a strong effort to upgrade 
MNC activity according to strategic priorities, directing investments into 
higher-value-added activities and inducing existing affiliates to upgrade 
their technology and functions. This strategy involves extensive 
interventions in factor markets (skill creation, institution building, 
infrastructure development, and supplier support), encouraging R&D and 
technology institutions and attracting, targeting, and guiding investments.5 
Strategic FDI-dependent strategies entail considerable industrial policy, 
but the intensity of government intervention is lower than with 
autonomous strategies that will be introduced below. The sources of 
technical change remain largely outside, in the hands of MNCs; there is 
less need to intervene to promote learning in infant industries for this 
reason. However, industrial policy is needed to ensure the development of 
the relevant skills, capabilities, and institutions required to ensure that 
MNCs keep transferring new technologies and higher-value functions.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p. 37, April 2003. 
6 Ibid. 
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2. ISI restructuring involves exports growing from established import-
substituting industries where competitive (or nearly competitive) 
capabilities have developed. The main policy tool is trade liberalization or 
strong export incentives (some, as in Latin America, within regional trade 
agreements). This leads to considerable upgrading, restructuring, and 
expansion of these industries along with their supplier networks. In some 
countries, the main agents are domestic enterprises, and in others, they are 
MNCs. The main difference from the “autonomous” strategy is the lack of 
clear and coordinated industrial policy to develop export competitiveness, 
with haphazard (and often weak) support for skills, technology, 
institutions, and infrastructure.7 3. Autonomous is based on the development of capabilities of domestic 
firms, starting with simple activities and deepening over time. This 
strategy uses extensive industrial policy, reaching in to trade, finance, 
education, training, technology, and industry structure. It involves 
selective restrictions on FDI and actively encourages technology imports 
in other forms. All these interventions are carried out in a strongly export-
oriented setting, with favors granted in return for good export 
performance.8	  
Regarding the last type of strategy, Lall also points out that from the policy 
aspect, autonomous strategies entail a great deal of industrial policy and accompanying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid. 
8  Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p. 47, April, 2003. 
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interventions in factor markets and institutions. Interventions, generally in the form of 
tariff, quota, etc., may result in an oligopoly and a higher domestic price in the protected 
domestic market than that in the international market. Then the high price may cover the 
higher production costs and help the inefficient immature firms remain in business. With 
the profits gained inefficiently during the protection period, the domestic firms would 
improve their experience and efficiency such that they improve quality and reduce 
operational costs. In the end, government interventions lead to massive development and 
deepening of indigenous skills and technological capabilities, with a national ability to 
keep abreast of new technologies and for domestic enterprises to become significant 
global players in their own right. However, such strategies are increasingly difficult and 
risky on economic grounds—the sheer pace of technical change and the growth of 
international production systems raises the costs of being left on the outside. They are 
also increasingly constricted by the new rules of the game being laid down by 
international agencies and developed countries. 
Consequently, Lall (2003) also demonstrates that the utilization of those four 
types of strategies is not static. Those using passive FDI strategies are moving towards 
more targeted strategies. Strategic FDI-dependent countries are trying to strengthen 
capabilities in domestic firms and build up the institutional structure for innovation. 
Autonomous countries are becoming more integrated into MNC systems (and have many 
capable MNCs of their own). These changes are driven both by new technologies and 
globalization as well as by new rules of the game and are likely to persist into the 
foreseeable future.9 This does not mean that countries will converge technologically. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p. 57, April, 2003. 
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There will remain significant differences in technology and competitive performance 
because of differences in endowments (size, location, resources, etc.) and in inherited 
structures of technological learning. National systems of technology development have 
elements of path dependence and stability and can change only as the institutional, 
technological, and human capital base evolves, so it is necessarily a slow process.10 
Inherited structures also influence how flexibly and dynamically countries respond to 
new competitive challenges. This feedback process can let leaders maintain their 
advantage for very long periods. FDI can help to change national technological systems, 
but the real driver of change lies within each economy. Government policies and 
institutional structures together play a vital role here, and this role remains even as its 
form and content evolves. 
On the other hand, according to Lall (2003), governments should use policy 
intervention on MNCs as well as support local firms’ growth. With a completely passive 
policy, MNC exports can remain at low, technologically stagnant levels. Thus, an MNC-
dependent export strategy needs a proactive element of dynamic competitiveness. More 
importantly, depending on FDI is not a substitute for strengthening domestic 
capabilities.11 There are many activities that MNCs should not enter, including many 
localized ones that tend to be populated by SMEs (small and medium enterprises). They 
also need efficient local suppliers if they are going beyond the assembly of imported 
components. Capturing the spillover benefits of foreign presence needs capable local 
firms. More importantly, a strong base of national enterprises can lead to broader, deeper, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p .59, April, 2003. 
11 Sanjaya Lall, Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia, p. 63, April, 2003. 
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and more flexible capabilities because the technology development process with foreign 
affiliates may be curtailed as compared with local firms. The very fact that an affiliate 
can draw upon its parent company for technical information, skills, technological 
advances, etc. means that it needs to invest less in its own capabilities. This applies 
particularly to functions like advanced engineering, design, or R&D, which MNCs tend 
to centralize in industrial countries. As industries mature, it is imperative for developing 
countries to undertake these functions locally to support their future comparative 
advantage. This is why some countries choose to promote technology development in 
indigenous firms. 
Besides the basic ideas, more important is the practical application of government 
interventions. There are three issues that should be addressed. First, intervention with 
MNCs needs an appropriate level. If the domestic firms have grown to be able to compete 
with the MNCs, the intervention is no longer needed and keeping the intervention in 
place would induce costs. If the intervention expected to be used for a long time, then the 
domestic firms would have less incentive to promote their production efficiency. All the 
interventions should be adjusted according to the relative competitiveness difference 
between domestic firms and MNCs. Second, learning effects should be generated during 
the government intervention. Without learning effects, the domestic firms are unlikely to 
improve and grow in R&D. Third, interventions should not be carried out in all the 
immature industries. The industries that have strong knowledge spillover function to 
other related industries, such as the automotive industry, should have the priorities of 
enjoying the government intervention with MNCs. Moreover, the intervention is 
	  21 
unnecessary for those industries that have rare competition in the global range, even if 
they are underdeveloped. 
Theory Utilization in Case Study 
When it comes to the case study of the Chinese automobile industry, those 
development processes are quite similar to Dunning’s “eclectic paradigm,” and policies 
are similar to Lall’s “theory of FDI utilization.”  
 
Figure 2. Outward and inward FDI in the Chinese automobile industry (1998–2013). 
Source: Data from Chinese automobile Industry Yearbook 2014 and calculated by author. 
According to Figure 2, from 1988 to 1994, China faced a negative NOI position. 
Because they were net FDI receivers, they mostly took advantage of the country’s natural 
resources. On the other hand, outward FDI was negligible or nonexistent. From 1994 to 
2001, the NOI position decreases because of an increase inflow of FDI, while outward 
investment remains low or negligible. From 2001 to 2004, China exhibited a growing 
NOI position due to an increased rate of growth of outward FDI and a gradual slowdown 
	  22 
in inward FDI. 2004 to 2007 is distinguished by a shift to a positive NOI position as 
outward FDI stock exceeded inward FDI stock. Finally, from 2008 until today, we find 
the NOI position of the Chinese automobile industry reflects high levels of inward and 
outward FDI.  
Regarding the industrial policies part, even though Lall’s “theory of FDI 
utilization” is trying to talk about four types of industrial strategy, in the case of China’s 
auto industry, it is also appropriate to associate those four types with four phases in the 
development of the auto industry. The first phase regarding Lall’s theory of FDI in the 
thesis will be classified as the “extremely passive FDI-dependent strategy,” and it could 
be illustrated by Chinese automotive industry policy from 1978 to 1994. The second 
phase incorporating Lall’s theory of FDI in the thesis will be the “partial strategic FDI-
dependent strategy,” illustrated by the Chinese automotive industry policy from 1994 to 
2001. The third phase incorporating Lall’s theory of FDI in the thesis will be the “ISI 
restructuring strategy,” illustrated by the Chinese automotive industry policy from 2001 
to 2007. And the fourth phase incorporating Lall’s theory of FDI in the thesis will be the 
“industrial upgrading strategy,” demonstrated by the Chinese automotive industry policy 
from 2008 until today. Under each phase, industrial environment, industrial 
characteristics, and industrial policies at each period were analyzed.  
Upon considering the four types of industrial strategies in the “theory of FDI 
utilization” as four phases, we can see it has something in common with Dunning’s 
“eclectic paradigm.” And in the policy part, it also could be seen as supplementary to 
Dunning’s theory. According to Dunning (1996) and the real situation of the Chinese 
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automobile industry, during the first phase, China had insufficient location advantages,12 
thus both inward and outward investment were extremely limited and the MNCs 
preferred to access these countries through trade as well as enter into nonequity 
relationships with local firms. Under this situation, we could see the type of industrial 
policy used by the Chinese central government was relatively passive. It included 
providing basic infrastructure and a welcoming FDI policy regime. Skill upgrading and 
domestic technological activity were relatively neglected. During the second phase, 
China already had locational advantages in primary commodities and natural resources, 
and according to Dunning (1996), at this time government policies influenced the process 
through incentives or tariffs, as the competitiveness of local firms at this stage was still 
very low and the outward FDI remained extremely low. The policy explanation was quite 
similar to Lall’s “strategic FDI-dependent industrial policy.” Lall pointed out in this 
phase, there was a strong effort to upgrade MNC activity according to strategic priorities, 
directing investments into higher-value-added activities and inducing existing affiliates to 
upgrade their technology and functions. This strategy involved extensive intervention in 
factor markets (skill creation, institution building, infrastructure development, and 
supplier support), encouraging R&D and technology institutions, and attracting, 
targeting, and guiding investments. During the third phase, there was an increase in NOI 
position. Competition in the domestic market rose as the ownership advantages of the 
inward investors diffused through the local industry. As a result, the domestic firms 
started developing their own advantages. The ownership advantages of local firms were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Location advantages are related to the host country (factor prices, factor endowments, and 
distance measured as transport costs). 
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increasingly associated with the property of intangible assets and less dependent on 
government policies; the role of the government was still relevant and oriented towards a 
reduction of market failures and inefficient industries as well as towards promoting an 
increasing integration of local and foreign companies, which minimized the 
delocalization risks. The incentives policy should aim to attract FDI in activities in which 
local companies do not have competitive advantages as well as to stimulate domestic 
firms to exploit their own advantages in new markets. And the country’s location 
advantages began changing from cheap labor force and natural resources to created assets 
(sophisticated markets, qualified labor, technological capacity of the more dynamic 
sectors, and development of economies of agglomeration). The production processes 
were more capital-intensive, reflecting a lower cost of capital compared with the cost of 
labor. It is quite similar to Lall’s ISI restructuring policy. At this time, exports were 
growing from established import-substituting industries where competitive (or nearly 
competitive) capabilities had developed. The main policy tool was strong export 
incentives (some, as in Latin America, within regional trade agreements). This led to 
considerable upgrading, restructuring, and expansion of these industries along with their 
supplier networks. In some countries, the main agents were domestic enterprises, and in 
others, they were MNCs.  
During the fourth phase, according to Lall, China had a kind of autonomous 
strategic policy, which is quite similar to Dunning’s fifth phase in investment 
development path. As a result, FDI depended less on the condition of the host country 
and more on the localization strategies of MNCs. Regarding the government, the role of 
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government took on a strategic dimension, increasingly behaving as an oligopoly with 
MNCs and with other governments. 
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CHAPTER THREE: FIRST PHASE (1978–1994) 
Introduction of Extremely Passive FDI-Dependent Automobile  
Industrial Strategies (1978–1994) 
Automobile production in China was started in the early 1950s with the help of 
the Soviet Union. Since then, vehicle production kept rising. Initially, the vehicles were 
produced mainly for commercial and military use. After 1978, China’s economic opening 
and reforms stimulated a rapid growth in demand for vehicles. According to statistical 
data from the China Association of Automobile Manufactures (CAAM), China’s demand 
for automobiles (including trucks and buses) stood at fewer than 150,000 in the late 
1970s. In the mid-1980s, growth in demand greatly exceeded domestic production 
capacity, leading to a massive influx of foreign vehicles, especially saloons. In the peak 
year, 1985, imports amounted to 44 percent of total domestic demand; by the mid-1990s, 
demand had risen to over 1.5 million vehicles (Table 1). 
Table 1. Chinese Automobile Production, 1978–1998 
Year 
Production (000) (A) 
Imports (units) Demand (%) Total Trucks Saloons Buses 
1978 149 96 3 – – – 
1985 443 237 5 12 354 44.4 
1990 509 269 42 23 65 11.3 
1995 1453 572 325 247 158 9.8 
1998 1629 483 508 367 40 2.4 
Source: China Association of Automobile Manufactures (1999). 
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The rapid growth in demand for vehicles encouraged a proliferation of vehicle 
makers. In the meantime, a fundamental transformation of the country, from central 
planning toward economic development of the socialist market economy, also 
remarkably changed the structure of the automotive market in China. Under the socialist 
market economy, provincial and municipal governments and ministries had more 
autonomy to make decisions without the fear of being accused of embracing capitalism. 
Thus, many of them chose the automotive industry as a pillar industry to develop the 
economy of their regions. However, the production system that had been built largely for 
defense purposes was unable to satisfy the new demand. The industry suffered from poor 
economies of scale, narrow model range, low production capacity, and low technological 
levels. For instance, the number of automobile assembly plants rose from around 50 in 
the mid-1970s to over 120 in the early 1990s. But in 1990, only two vehicle 
manufacturers had an annual output of more than 50,000 units. The majority of 
manufacturers produced fewer than 10,000 units per annum (MMB, ZQGN, 1996:68). 
The shortage soon led to a growing number of imported vehicles. Throughout the 1980s, 
the number of imported cars was higher than the number of domestically produced cars. 
If illegally imported cars were included, the number would be much higher. This shocked 
the Chinese central government into more carefully considering its policy towards this 
hugely important sector. 
The restructuring in the Chinese auto industry mainly took the form of joint 
ventures with foreign automobile companies, absorption of foreign direct investment, 
technology transfers, and making high trade barriers for automotive imports. The Chinese 
government strongly supported joint ventures, technology licensing, and other 
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comprehensive policies at that time. There are two main reasons: (1) Those policies are in 
accordance with the renewed faith of China in the working of the market economy, as 
demonstrated by the deregulation and liberalization of markets and the wholesale 
privatization of state-owned assets. At that time, China was approaching the “takeoff” 
stage in its economic development. Competition for the world’s scarce resources of 
capital, technology, and organizational skills was becoming increasingly intense. MNCs 
are at the forefront of innovation, and their presence provides an effective means of 
keeping up with technical progress. Their established brand names, global marketing 
presence, and international flows of information all added to their technological 
advantages. Therefore, the Chinese government believed that MNCs were among the 
most powerful means available for transferring modern technologies to China and 
overcoming obstacles to their utilization. Their presence could only benefit local 
productivity and competitiveness. (2) Those measures were feasible at that time. The 
increasing globalization of economic activity and the integration of international 
production and cross-border markets by MNCs made those policies feasible (UNCTAD 
1993). The key ingredients of contemporary economic growth of created assets, such as 
technology, intellectual capital, learning experience, and organizational competence was 
not only becoming more mobile across national boundaries but was also becoming 
increasingly housed in MNC systems.  
During this period, China expected to use policy tools to support state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in order to get technology transfer and spillover from the developed 
countries. In other words, all of these FDI policies used by China were the strategies of 
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“exchange market for technology,” which were kinds of passive FDI-dependent strategies. 
We introduce the main auto policies, both on the supply side and on the demand side. 
Supply-Side Policy 
Joint venture regulation 
The joint venture regulation was a strict central government requirement. Under 
this regulation, the Chinese central government only allowed international automotive 
manufactures to make engines and finish cars in joint ventures with local Chinese 
manufacturers—and to possess no more than 50 percent of share holdings. During this 
period, if foreign companies wished to operate in China, they would be forced to 
establish their operations as joint ventures with Chinese state-owned enterprises (Oliver 
and Holweg, 2006).  
Initially, China asked the Japanese for help. The Japanese exported a large 
number of trucks and agreed to provide some technical assistance to the Chinese during 
the early 1970s (Harwit, 1995). But the Japanese were wary of generating potential 
competitors of their own automobile companies, so the extent and duration of their 
technology transfer were limited.  
Then, in the mid-1980s, the international automakers—American Motors 
Corporation (AMC), Volkswagen, Chrysler, Citroen, Peugeot, etc.—were allowed to 
manufacture cars in China in the form of joint ventures with the SOEs as partners. The 
first automotive joint venture was the Beijing Jeep Corporation (BJC). It was signed 
between state-owned Beijing Automobile Industry Corporation (BAIC) and AMC in 
January 1984. In this joint venture, AMC was mandated to provide all the new 
technology for Beijing Jeep. At that time, according to the “joint venture regulation,” 
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AMC duly took a minority stake for automobile joint ventures. For this first joint venture, 
technology was transferred in the form of “complete knockdown” (CKD) kits. CKD kits 
are sets of automotive parts that are packaged in one country and then exported to another 
for assembly. For the Beijing Jeep joint venture, Jeep Cherokee CKD kits were packaged 
in the United States by AMC and then exported to China by selling to Beijing Jeep for 
assembly by the BJC Chinese workers. In 1987, because of marketplace changes and 
management changes in AMC, BJC was sold to Chrysler. Chrysler’s management and 
perception of technology transfer were totally different from those of AMC. From 1987 
to 2005, Chrysler did not transfer any technology to Chinese partners. Thus, in 2005, BJC 
was sold to Daimler AG. 
Shortly after the establishment of Beijing Jeep, a second joint venture was 
established between the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) and 
Volkswagen in October 1984. Volkswagen took a 50 percent stake of that venture. 
Shanghai Volkswagen began automobile production in 1985. As car imports fell to some 
34,000 in 1990, Shanghai Volkswagen’s production of its Santana models reached nearly 
19,000 vehicles that year, and Shanghai Volkswagen’s output had reached 100,000 
vehicles by 1993. In the long run, Shanghai Volkswagen has proven to be more 
successful than Beijing Jeep, as it produced cars that could be used as taxis, government 
officials’ vehicles, or cars for the newly emerging business elite. By far, it is the largest 
annual producer of passenger cars since the mid-1980s. Volkswagen also encouraged its 
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foreign parts suppliers to create joint ventures in China, and their resulting products 
helped Shanghai Volkswagen achieve an 85 percent local content rate by 1993.13  
Meanwhile, two new joint ventures were formed: one in 1990 between 
Volkswagen and First Auto Works to produce Jettas; and another between French Citroen 
and Second Auto Works (now Dongfeng Motor Corporation) to produce the Fukang 
compact in 1992. 
During this period, joint venture regulation was a favored government instrument 
for achieving technology transfer and rapid industrial growth. Under this regulation, 
technology was transferred to Chinese partners through joint ventures. But we should 
also note that even though ownership of foreign carmakers was controlled by regulation, 
carmakers still had complete freedom to decide the kind of technology they transferred to 
Chinese partners. In the long run, foreign automotive companies would retain most of the 
control while the Chinese partners would have little real power. 
Technology licensing 
Chinese auto companies also licensed technology from foreign firms in these 
nascent years. Technology licensing involves an agreement whereby an owner of a 
technology intellectual property (the licensor) allows another party (the licensee) to use, 
modify, or resell that property in exchange for compensation (consideration). The 
compensation may take the form of a (1) lump sum royalty, (2) royalty based on volume 
of production (called running royalty), or (3) right to use the licensee’s technology (called 
cross licensing).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Harwit, Eric (2001). “The Impact of WTO Membership on the Automobile Industry in China.” 
The China Quarterly: 655-670. Retrieved 2010-09-16. 
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In the 1980s, the Chinese government encouraged auto companies to sign 
technology-licensing agreements with foreign firms in order to push the upgrade of the 
local auto industry. One prime example is the acquisition of technology for the ubiquitous 
compact cars used as taxis in many large cities. Tianjin Automotive Industry Corporation 
(TAIC) licensed technology from Daihatsu in 1986 to produce the Xiali (Charade) mini 
sedans, which were often used as red taxis in Beijing and Tianjin. In another example, 
Chang’An licensed technology from Suzuki in 1983 to produce its own mini car, which is 
also used as the yellow taxi in Chongqing (Chang’An Automobile Group, 2002).  
Through licensing of proprietary technology, Chinese auto firms earned 
substantial income from markets they could not penetrate on their own, and foreign auto 
firms could have foreign affiliates without high financial and legal risks. The benefits 
brought by technology licensing in this brief period made profit-oriented Chinese 
automakers start to passively rely on foreign automakers. 
Trade barriers 
Traditional trade barriers, such as a high import tariff, a restrictive annual quota, 
and an importation license, were adopted in order to protect China’s immature 
automobile industries. The import tariff had been historically high, in the range of 200 to 
300 percent in the 1980s and 100 to 200 percent in the early to mid-1990s in the Chinese 
automotive industry (Huang, 2003), and the Chinese government tightly controlled legal 
vehicle imports at that time.  
Japan and Korea commonly used trade barriers to protect their immature 
automotive industries, and the trade barriers helped them become famous carmaking 
nations. China wanted to learn from Japan and Korea by adopting trade barriers to protect 
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the supported SOEs with a relatively easy environment. However, things were contrary to 
China’s desires and wishes, and trade barriers promoted foreign investment in China and 
put SOEs into a much more competitive environment.     
Demand-Side Policy 
As to the demand-side policy, during the central planning stage (1949–1978), 
volumes and variety were centrally planned rather than controlled by the market. Most 
vehicles were trucks, and the production of passenger cars was very limited. Sedans were 
only available to senior officials, and there were strict regulations on official car use. 
With the relaxation of planning after 1978, there were many more customers, and the 
market for sedans and other vehicles increased greatly. For example, there were no taxis 
during the central planning period, so as restrictions were relaxed, sedans and minivans 
were produced to supply the taxi market. Also, to help create a market for these new 
automobile joint ventures, the Chinese government officially permitted private ownership 
of automobiles starting in 1984. 
The Effects of Passive FDI-Dependent Automobile  
Industrial Policy (1978–1994) 
On the one hand, we should note that China was in the first phase of development 
during this period. At this stage, China normally had insufficient locational advantages 
due to the limited domestic market (low per capita income), a poorly educated 
workforce, inappropriate infrastructure, and even political and/or economic instability. As 
a result, both inward and outward investments were extremely limited, and the MNCs 
preferred to access these countries through trade as well as to enter into nonequity 
relationships with local firms (Dunning and Narula, 1996).  
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Under these conditions, as Dunning and Narula (1996) suggest, a country owns 
few created assets and only high-natural-asset countries can attract a significant amount 
of FDI (natural-resource-seeking FDI). Thus, the government’s role in this phase consists 
mainly of providing basic infrastructure and upgrading the economy’s human capital, 
through educational and training programs, as well as implementing import-substitution 
and export-promotion policies, which affect the structure of local markets and industries.  
During this period, Chinese automotive industry policies were extremely simple 
because the Chinese government at that time just learned to let in MNCs but did not 
know whether and how much FDI to allow in, that is, if one should exercise selectivity in 
letting in MNCs (Lall, 2003, p. 35). But China’s “economic opening and reforms” policy 
helped China achieve the economic growth, including building up basic infrastructures, 
upgrading the economy’s human capital, promoting educational and training programs, 
and so on.  
On the other hand, we cannot deny that the Chinese automotive policies proved 
far from successful at this stage. First, the government ignored the real-world situations 
in which there was an important distinction between the transfer and utilization of 
production technologies and the transfer and development of more complex design, 
development, and innovative capabilities. By then, China had not gained much innovative 
ability or know-how from foreign firms. The only real requirement for foreign companies 
was to get the technology into production, and there were no specific stipulations on 
technology transfer. An authentic example is when Chinese auto companies licensed 
technology from foreign firms. After obtaining auto models, Chinese auto companies 
merely produced cars according to the original models—even after 17 years, these cars 
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remained virtually unchanged from their original model. A passive reliance on MNCs to 
upgrade and deepen technological capabilities may take a very long time to bear results. 
Second,  
The development of high-level capabilities in local firms may be more 
beneficial than a similar development within MNC affiliates. This would 
be the case where technological development by local firms leads to 
greater spillover benefits and linkages (to local suppliers and institutions) 
within the host economy. (Lall, 2003) 
 The Chinese government tried to make local firms strong, but things went in the 
wrong direction. All the policies used by the Chinese government during this period, 
including joint venture regulation and trade barriers, aimed to protect the supported 
SOEs. The Chinese government only gave the franchise of making cars to several SOEs, 
which kept the indigenous private firms out of the game. Lack of horizontal competition 
crushed the creative motivation of SOEs. Moreover, a strong MNC presence in the 
industry, while stimulating local competitors to be more efficient in their production, 
would inhibit them from deepening their technological capabilities. Because of the higher 
risks and the longer learning periods involved in creating a design and development 
capability, local firms exposed to full MNC competition may have preferred to import 
foreign technologies proven and “ready made” from overseas rather than invest in their 
own R&D capabilities (Lall, 2003). This is the so-called passive FDI-dependent, which 
means the industrial growth was not driven by FDI but relied largely on market forces to 
upgrade the structure.  
To summarize, even though passive FDI-dependent strategies let China benefit 
from the jobs and tax revenues associated with those joint ventures, it could not help 
China model itself after Japan and Korea.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: SECOND PHASE (1994–2001) 
Introduction of Partial Strategic FDI-dependent Automobile  
Industrial Policy (1994–2001) 
About 1994 and after, the criterion for judging the success of FDI by the Chinese 
government changed in a way that has made for a more cooperative stance between 
China and foreign investors. It changed from direct contribution of foreign affiliates to a 
model with a wider impact: upgrading the competitiveness of a host country’s indigenous 
capability and promoting its dynamic comparative advantage. And the Chinese 
government started realizing that the learning experience of countries about what MNCs 
can and cannot do for host countries could enable its government better to understand and 
assess its consequences and to take action to ensure that it could more efficiently promote 
its economic and social goals. During this period, the Chinese government started 
thinking about the problem of having allowed in FDI and whether to intervene selectively 
in the operations of MNCs. Thus, in March 1994, the Partial Strategic FDI-Dependent 
Automobile Industrial Strategies—“Chinese Automotive Industry Policy 1994”—was 
enacted by the central government, as noted in Appendix A. All polices could mainly be 
divided into two parts: protection and development. The protection policy is quite similar 
to those in other developing countries. For example, the Chinese government continued 
to protect all manufacturers located in China (including joint ventures) from international 
competition by establishing import quotas and stiff tariffs (80 to 100 percent) on both 
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vehicles and parts. As to the development policy, it is quite unique. Compared to 
previous auto policies, the 1994 policy took a stricter development approach. Under this 
policy, the Chinese government continued to limit foreign ownership in joint ventures to 
50 percent, to give the Chinese partners more control and bargaining power. Besides that, 
according to the new policy, foreign companies were limited to have at most two local 
partners. Moreover, the Chinese government also created more new restrictions on MNCs, 
such as “local content rule” and “entry limit.”  
Supply-Side Policy 
Local content rule 
The local content rule is commonly used in developing countries to restrict 
imports as a nontariff barrier and stimulate the development of domestic industries. The 
Chinese government uses the local content rule in a strict way. For example, to 
complement the joint venture requirement, the international joint ventures were required 
to have a local content rate above 40 percent in the first year of production and to 
increase the rate to 60 percent and 80 percent in the second and third years (KPMG, 
2004). This means all joint ventures must localize their parts and components by at least 
40 percent (and powerful incentives were created to go beyond compliance). Foreign 
firms vying for new joint ventures were asked to transfer more knowledge to their 
partners, and they were told to establish joint technical centers with the aim of training 
Chinese workers.  
In local content rules, government policy also prohibited knockdown kits and 
offered preferential tax rates for enterprises with high localization rates. The policy 
makers expected that the joint venture format would force in-house technology spillover 
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to take place. Affiliated requirements and encouragements include setting up R&D 
divisions within the joint venture, making products at the international technology levels, 
intending to export, and giving the indigenous suppliers equal privileges for sourcing 
contracts.  
By 1998, officially recorded imports accounted for less than three percent of the 
Chinese total vehicle market. The leading vehicle makers had all achieved a higher 
degree of local content, sourcing a large fraction of their components from domestic 
producers. For example, at Beijing Jeep and Shanghai Volkswagen, the share of local 
components had risen from under 20 percent in 1987 to over 80 percent by 1995 (Lo, 
1997)14. Every coin has two sides—under the local content rule, the policy makers 
regarded foreign cars produced in China with a high content rate of locally-produced 
parts as Chinese indigenous cars, and thus some SOEs at that time decided to give up 
indigenous brands and existing independent car making operations that were regarded as 
outdated and hopeless, and to focus on supporting and serving the international joint 
ventures (Luo, 2004). 
Entry limit 
In order to form the economy of scale among indigenous auto firms, the central 
government continued to limit industry entry and still only gave the franchise of making 
cars to several supported SOEs, particularly the Chinese “big three, small three and min 
two”15. That kind of entry limit also had been implemented on MNCs. International 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Lo Dic. Market and Institutional Regulation in Chinese Industrialization, 1978-94 (London: 
Macmillan, 1997). 
15 The “big three” were First Automotive Works, Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation, 
and Dongfeng Motor Company; the “small three” were Beijing Automotive Industrial Corporation, Tianjin 
	  39 
automakers were allowed to manufacture cars only with those authorized SOEs in their 
joint ventures. Actually, only Volkswagen, PSA, Chrysler, and Daihatsu gained the right 
to produce cars because the policy makers decided China did not need too many 
passenger cars. Making cars with Volkswagen, Citroen, and Peugeot were already 
enough. They were worried that too many companies entering the industry would bring 
overcapacity like in the U.S. automotive industry. Meanwhile, indigenous private 
investment was forbidden in automobile production, although allowed in other businesses 
like textile, television, etc., because the government regarded the automotive industry as a 
pillar industry that needs government central planning the most. 
To summarize, entry limit policy on foreign automakers limited the number of 
MNCs but did not achieve the goal of selectivity on FDI. Limiting the industry entry 
policy was aimed to reshuffle the top 20 auto manufacturers into just three or four SOE 
enterprise groups “in order to meet foreign competition;” however, the entry limit 
deprived some private Chinese automakers of their competing rights.  
In order to push MNCs to transfer more complex design and innovative activities 
to their Chinese partners, the Chinese government made some new policies to improve 
and strengthen SOEs’ production ability. Those policies included “consolidation” and 
“comprehensive encouragement” on the supply side and “market creation” on the 
demand side. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Automotive Industrial Corporation, and Guangzhou Automotive Industrial Corporation; and the “mini two” 
were Changan and Guizhou Aviation (Xia, 2002). 
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Consolidation 
In the mid-1990s, the Chinese automotive industry was highly fragmented in 
terms of the quantity of manufactures, geographical distribution, and the ownership of 
manufacturers. This fragmentation led to inefficiency of the scale-sensitive automotive 
production.  
The Chinese automotive industry was highly fragmented in terms of the number 
of manufactures, its geographical distribution, and the ownership of manufacturers at that 
time. This fragmentation led to inefficiency in scale-sensitive automotive production. The 
fragmentation or diseconomy of scale took three patterns of manifestation: fragmentation 
by manufacturer, fragmentation by ownership, and fragmentation by region. 
Fragmentation of manufacturers 
In the 1980s, the Chinese government implemented industrial protectionism 
polices and regulations to protect its immature automotive industry. With the high price 
margin, many municipal governments started to produce cars within their affiliated 
enterprises. At the same time, a lot of military plants also tried to convert their 
manufacturing operations into automotive production. However, all those regulations 
made inefficient automotive enterprises highly survivable and profitable. The 
government’s pursuit of a scale economy filled the Chinese automotive industry with 
various automotive firms with low production rates that were controlled by different 
regional governments and in different provinces. The profitable automotive business 
attracted a large number of state-owned entrants in the 1980s, and most of them still 
inefficiently remain in business, with the profits made due to market protection. This is 
the reason for the large number of manufacturers. 
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Fragmentation of ownership 
Other reasons for the fragmentation are raveled together mainly by the 
governmental mechanism that affected the ownership structure in China. And the 
diversified ownership is the major reason associated with the large number of 
manufacturers and the fragmentation by region. 
The ownerships of major indigenous automotive industry corporations in China 
are listed below in Table 2; in fact, the political ownership to some extent determined the 
geographical distribution of automotive corporations in China. All these facilities were 
spread over the country’s territory and belong to different governmental bureaus or 
administrations. 
Table 2. Ownership of Chinese Indigenous Automotive Industry Corporations in 
2000 
Indigenous automotive corporations Ownership 
First Automotive Works Central government 
Dongfeng Motor Corporation Central government 
ChangAn Automotive Corporation China Weapon and Arming Group (central government) 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. Shanghai municipal government 
Beijing Automotive Industry Corp. Beijing municipal government 
Guangzhou Automotive Industry Group Guangzhou municipal government 
Hafei Motor Co. Ltd China Second Group of Aeronautic Industry (central 
government) 
Chery Automobile Co. Ltd Wuhu municipal government 
Source: Company websites and various sources. 
Fragmentation of region 
Because nonautomotive manufacturing enterprises were owned by different 
central government agencies and different regional governments—and were therefore 
originally dispersed—the automotive industry was inevitably scattered geographically 
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when these plants were turned into automotive operations. This is the reason for the 
fragmentation by region. 
In 1998, The State Planning Committee (SPC), the nation’s economic regulator, 
was renamed the National Development Commission (NDC). On behalf of the central 
government, the NDC was dedicated to regulating the big automotive groups in order to 
achieve industrial efficiency. Based on industry experience and technological capacity—
as well as general regional balance considerations—the NDC determined to support eight 
Chinese car assemblers, which were later known as the “big three,” “small three,” and 
“two mini.” “Big three” refers to three major car assemblers, FAW, SAW, and Shanghai-
VW; “small three” refers to three small assemblers, Beijing-Cherokee, Tianjin-Charade, 
and Guangzhou-Peugeot (later Guangzhou-Honda); and “two mini” refers to two new 
firms with defense-industry background—their parent companies were the China 
Ordnance Industry Corporation and the Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation, and 
through their strong bargaining power and close relationships with top government 
leaders, they obtained special permission from the NDC to produce mini cars. China 
intended to focus most of its own energy and investment on those eight companies. 
According to that policy, we should note that only a small number of firms, which we call 
SOEs (controlled by the central government), could enjoy the support from the central 
government. Other local firms did not have right to reap the benefits brought by the 
consolidation policy.  
The Chinese government also tried to convert the myriad small vehicle plants to 
component suppliers for the giants of the industry (CDBW, 7 September 1997). Loss- 
making firms in the sector were to be declared bankrupt and sold their assets to large 
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firms or merged with them. The Ministry of Machine Building announced that each year 
it would withdraw the licenses from many small loss-making plants if they continued to 
make losses or were reluctant to merge with other plants. Promising enterprises were to 
receive priority for government endorsement in overseas listings and issuing industrial 
bonds abroad (China Economic Digest, Spring 1997:20).  
The consolidation process was very slow. Based on the current ownership 
structure involved with fragmented but strong political power of various ambitious local 
governments and central government ministries, large-scale regrouping (merger and 
acquisition) was still difficult to achieve across different political administrations. At that 
time, very few mergers or acquisitions were observed, with only FAW acquiring Tianjin 
Automotive Industry Corporation, SAIC acquiring Liuzhou Wulin Motors with GM, and 
Changan controlling Jiangling Motors with Ford. If the political regulation system 
remained unchanged, it would take a long time for China to consolidate its automotive 
industry to the level of the U.S. counterpart (although deepening consolidation was 
predictable along with the general industrial maturation process). 
Although the NDC tried to foster the formation of industrial efficiency in 
indigenous auto firms, the result was far from satisfactory. At that time, the rapid growth 
of output from the government’s targeted key point plants produced an explosive process 
of concentration of market share in saloon vehicle production. Among saloon market 
share, Shanghai Volkswagen’s joint venture with Volkswagen accounted for 47 percent 
of total domestic saloon vehicle production, and the Tianjin Charade joint venture 
accounted for 20 percent by 1996 (Table 3). We can see that joint ventures accounted for 
almost the entire output of saloons while the Chinese partners lacked the capability to 
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develop new vehicles independently. As to the technical disadvantages, a key problem 
lay in the shortage of funds. In the automobile industry, it costs at least US$150 million 
and takes several years to develop a new product. None of the Chinese auto enterprises 
found this affordable (Beijing Review, 4 October 1999). The government wanted to offer 
some help, but it already earmarked a large fraction of its funds to support the auto 
industry in the emerging giants. It was bluntly recognized that China had failed 
comprehensively to catch up with the global giants of the industry (Peter Nolan, 
2001:540).  
Table 3. Saloon Vehicle Production in China, 1998 
Producer name Production (000) % 
Shanghai Auto/Volkswagen JW 236 46.5 
Tianjin/Daihatsu JV 100 19.7 
Yiqi/Volkswagen JW 66 13.0 
Dongfeng/Citroen JV 36 7.1 
Beijing Jeep/Daimler-Chrysler JV 8 1.6 
Others 62 12.1 
Total 508 100.0 
Source: ZQJYZ, ZQGN (1999:5-7). Note: Total number of producers = 19. 
 
Comprehensive encouragement policy 
Encouragement policies were mainly used in three areas: (1) Enterprise 
Organization Policy, the formation of automotive industry groups to attain critical-mass 
state support for enterprises that exceeded certain production volumes and R&D effort; 
(2) Technology Policy, the encouragement of independent product development; and (3) 
Investment Policy, the encouragement of automotive enterprises to raise development 
funds from various sources and transregional and transdepartmental investment to 
support increased industry concentration. 
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Demand-Side Policy—Market Creation 
To stimulate the market, the Chinese government reaffirmed its encouragement of 
private ownership of passenger cars. As noted, the Chinese government officially 
permitted the private ownership of vehicles in 1984. According to the consumption and 
pricing policy in “Chinese Automotive Industry Policy 1994,” the policy encouraged 
individual ownership of automobiles, and prices of civilian vehicles (except sedans) were 
to be decided by enterprises according to market demand.  
However, many local governments used the consumption and pricing policy to 
make money. In other words, the slow progress in the development of mass auto 
assembly was largely due to local protectionism. Local governments used regulations and 
policies to favor the purchase of vehicles produced within their jurisdictions, which 
created protected local markets—resulting in a pattern of spatially dispersed small and 
inefficient indigenous assemblers. Local protectionism also operated in the favor of large 
assemblers, including joint ventures. For example, the Shanghai municipal government 
once required every city taxi to be Shanghai-Volkswagen’s Santana model. It still levied 
a lower license tax to Santana buyers who lived in its suburban areas. The central 
government also used protective measures to protect favored firms. In 1996 and 1997, 
Shanghai-Volkswagen initiated a price war by dropping the selling price of its Santana by 
20 percent. This effort consolidated the car market, but that came to an end just a year 
later when the central government stepped in and set a floor for price reductions. 
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The Impacts of Partial Strategic FDI-Dependent Automobile  
Industrial Policy (1994–2001) 
Promoting industrial development by using FDI was necessary to give birth to the 
1994 automobile policies. In order to more clearly show the results of the new 
automobile policy, this analysis is divided into two parts: vehicles and components. 
Vehicles 
Since China had plenty of resources, cheap labor, and big markets—which met 
with MNCs expectations—the stricter requirements in 1994 automotive policy did not 
seem to deter the next foreign investors in China. After the 1994 policy was issued, 
almost every big multinational automobile firm bid on a project to establish a joint 
venture with Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation, considered by many to be the best 
Chinese passenger-car firm. In the end, General Motors made the largest single foreign 
investment ever in China as of 1997 when it established its joint venture. Also in 1997, 
Honda took over Peugeot’s joint venture with Guangzhou Automotive Manufacturing 
Company, and then Ford entered into negotiations with Chang’an in 1999. There was a 
veritable flood of investment into the Chinese auto industry during the 1990s from both 
the Chinese government and foreign sources. The restructuring also resulted in a rapid 
increase the proportion of passenger cars in total vehicle production. The share of the car 
rose from 2.4 percent in 1980 to 31.2 percent in 1998, with light vehicles (trucks and 
buses) increasing from 19.5 percent to 29.3 percent, while mid-size trucks fell from 53 
percent to 11.3 percent. Accordingly, major car and light vehicle assembly centers, like 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Nanjing, had become new centers for vehicle production and 
important locations in the geography of China’s auto industry.  
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Looking at the data, the new policy seems to have been hugely successful. But 
upon further exploration, we find that the rapid increase in light vehicle production, like 
saloons, was merely created by foreign firms or JVs (Table 3). The large decrease in mid-
size trucks’ share stems from the extent of foreign involvement in the medium-duty truck 
sector being much lower than in the saloon car sector (Table 4).  
Table 4. Main Medium-Duty Truck Producers in China, 1998 (000) 
Producer Output 
Yiqi Group Company 72.2 
Dongfeng (Erqi) Auto Company 45.7 
Dongfeng Liuzhou Auto Company 5.5 
Hubei Special Vehicle Company 1.7 
Dongfeng Lianying Company 1.5 
Dongfeng Hangzhou Auto Company 1.4 
Luoyang Auto Company 0.6 
Dongfeng Nanjing Auto Company 0.5 
Source: ZQJYZ, ZQGN (1999:340). Note: Share of output produced by the top producer = 55.6%; total 
number of producers = 13. 
 
Components 
From fragmentation to consolidation  
Because the consolidation of the auto parts industry lagged behind vehicle 
assembly, lots of automakers used cheap and low-quality components manufactured by 
local firms. These local firms were typically township and village enterprises with small 
entry costs. According to official records, by the mid-1990s, it is estimated that there 
were around 4,800 components manufacturers across the country, most of which were 
tiny (FT, 5 March 1996). But in 1995, according to Chinese official statistics, there were 
1,600 component makers (Table 5). Then in 1996, the Ministry of Machine Building 
released a list of 300 companies in the components sector that would be supported. They 
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were eligible for policy loans and other preferential policies (FT, 5 March 1996). In the 
late 1980s, there were at least 200 enterprises manufacturing internal combustion 
engines, but in the 1990s, even in the medium-duty truck diesel engine sector, there were 
around 10 main producers (Bear, Stearns, 1994:14) and several smaller manufacturers. 
Table 5. Size Distributions of Chinese Component Makers, 1995 
Plant size Number of plants Value of sales (million yuan) Sales per plant (million yuan) 
Total 1671 40213 24.1 
Large 156 19534 125.2 
Large middle 86 4677 54.3 
Small middle 250 6782 27.1 
Small 1179 9219 7.8 
Source: MMB, ZQGN (1996:66). 
 
Boom under local content rules 
China’s tough local content rules were a “boon to the components sector” as 
Chinese vehicle production rose (FT, 21 May 1996). These forced the expanding 
automobile industry to purchase an increasing share of its inputs from local component 
makers and push them to improve quality, provide timeliness of delivery, and reduce 
costs of production. Even in the absence of foreign investment or government policy 
towards consolidation of the sector, it is likely that the growth of automobile output and 
the increasing role for market forces would have produced a rapid change in the 
institutional structure of China’s components industry (Nolan, 2001:543).  
Foreign investment was encouraged in the components sector. By 1995, there 
were over 60 joint ventures in the automobile sector, mostly for the manufacture of 
components (MMB, ZQGN, 1996:352). In the mid-1990s, the pace of foreign investment 
in components accelerated sharply, with many of the global leaders and specialist 
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components industry investment companies entering the industry. Also, joint ventures 
with globally powerful firms in the components sector were a major element in the rapid 
institutional change of the engine-making sector (Table 6). 
Table 6. FDI in Chinese Automobile Component Sector (1994–2001) 
Company 
Number of JVs  
built in China Ownership in China JVs Major products in China 
Type1: Components industry investment company 
ITT Automotive 
Pacific 
2 - Auto electrical systems, 
auto-locking brake systems, 
fuel handling systems, 
sensors, switches, and after-
sales products 
Asimco 13 - Auto components except 
engine 
Type 2: Investments by specialized multinational components company 
Delphi 7 - Produced 600,000 
automotive generators per 
year 
Robert Bosch 4 50% Computer-controlled EMS 
(engine management 
systems), diesel engine fuel 
injection components 
Valeo 6 Over 49 percent of the 
equity 
Clutch, air-conditioning, 
automobile electrical 
systems, and electric motors 
Denso 5 In the two JVs established 
in 1994-5, it held a 
minority share, but in the 
three established in 1996-
7, it held a majority stake 
Air-conditioners, alternators 
and starters, magnetos, CDI 
amplifiers and ignition 
coils, electronic control 
components 
Type 3: Foreign investment in engine making 
Company JV partner Ownership in China JVs Project 
Volkswagen First automobile 
works 
40% Produced around 500,000 
passenger car engines 
Mercedes-Benz South China Motor 
Corporation 
45% Built 100,000 engines for 
minibuses (as well as 
60,000 minibuses) annually 
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Toyota Tianjin Auto 50% Produced 150,000 1.3-liter 
car engines, mainly 
intended for use in the 
Charade mini-passenger 
vehicle produced by Tianjin 
Auto under license from 
Daihatsu 
Hino (a truck-
making affiliate of 
Toyota) 
China National 
Heavy Duty Truck 
Corporation 
- Produced truck engines 
Mitsubishi China Aerospace 
Automotive 
Industry Group 
- Manufactured vehicle 
engines of 2.0 and 2.4 liters, 
produced 150,000 units per 
year 
Lucas-Varity Tianjin Engine 
Works 
50% Manufactured diesel 
engines for use in trucks, 
buses, and power-
generating equipment, 
produced around 50,000 
engines per year 
Cummins Dongfeng 50% Manufactured truck diesel 
engines 
Source: Summarized and complied from various sources. 
However, looking behind the boom in the Chinese component market, Chinese 
component makers should learn lessons from Brazil. The Brazilian components industry 
offered an important lesson to China. The Brazilian automobile industry was much 
further advanced than the Chinese automobile industry, with a total output of vehicles 
and components roughly three times that of the Chinese in the mid-1990s (Mukherjee and 
Sastry, 1996). Like China, it developed a proliferation of mainly small indigenous 
component makers totaling around 1,000 in 1997. For decades, indigenous firms had 
been able to charge high prices for often low-quality products (FT, 9 July 1997). The 
rapid institutional change in the global components industry and fast expansion of 
international investment by the global giants of the auto industry had accelerated foreign 
penetration of the Brazilian components industry (FT, 9 July 1997). Small indigenous 
makers found it hard to compete with JVs established by the multinational giants. The 
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only way to attain the technology and economies of scale needed to survive was to join 
forces with the big international groups. Thus, many manufacturers could only hope to 
survive in the second tier, supplying the motor industry’s suppliers (FT, 9 July 1997). 
Chinese companies always wished to rely on others to help and teach them, which was a 
big mistake. 
During the second phase, as a country develops, the improvement of its locational 
advantages leads to a growth of inward FDI, especially in primary commodities and 
natural resources as well as in industries that are intensive in physical capital and low-
qualified work—sectors whose endowment of created assets are scarce. At this time, 
government policies may influence the process through incentives or tariffs, as the 
competitiveness of the local firms at this stage is still very low and the outward FDI 
remains extremely low but larger than in the first stage (Dunning and Narula, 1996). 
After analyzing the vehicle and component part, it is partially true that 
intervention could be used to promote the upgrading of MNC activities from those that 
are simple, labor-intensive, and low technology to those that are more complex and 
demanding by guiding foreign entry or providing strong incentives to all investors. As 
Dunning (1981) states, this opening up of the home market to foreign investors allows the 
construction of more and better infrastructures—which are technologically beneficial for 
training and qualification of local work—and the emergence of a national industry more 
intensive in resources. There is also an increased integration of domestic firms in MNC’s 
production chain, as well as a learning-by-doing and know-how transmission process to 
local firms. This allows these firms to create or upgrade their ownership advantages, 
which induces the emergence of outward FDI directed to adjacent countries in order to 
	  52 
find new markets (market-seeking FDI), and, to a lesser extent, strategic asset-seeking 
FDI in high-income countries. 
During this period, government policies may influence this trend, through 
incentives or tariffs, because the competitiveness of the local firms at this stage is still 
very low and the outward FDI remains extremely low but larger than in the previous 
stage. However, in this case study, even with strict government policies, China still failed 
to completely establish independent technological capabilities of the indigenous SOEs 
and lost control of the Chinese passenger car market to international automakers. The 
main reason is intended routines of the 1994 policy were distorted. At the very beginning, 
the “joint venture regulation,” “trade barriers,” “entry limit,” as well as the “local content 
rule” were created in order to cultivate advanced international competitiveness of SOEs. 
But in the end, the four development policies worked together and created the oligopoly. 
The entry limit regulated many private investors out of the automotive production 
business. Also, many automotive groups that created international joint ventures 
gradually gave up their own brands and merged their independent plants into the joint 
ventures to supply parts—in order to solely pursue the local content rate of joint ventures. 
Thus, the pursuit of local content rate also indirectly contributed to the oligopoly of the 
international joint ventures. Given the market power of the oligopoly, both the local 
partners and their international joint venture partners made huge profits relying on the 
high price for cars sold in China. Oligopoly naturally hinders technology innovations. 
The foreign partners postponed the update of the product line and kept selling outdated 
models even in a fast growing market. The oligopoly market environment and the cross-
holding joint venture structure reduced the international automakers’ incentive to conduct 
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R&D activities in the joint venture located in China. Moreover, because local firms also 
could become foreign firms’ potential competitors in the future, international firms would 
never really help local Chinese firms understand their key product technologies. 
Meanwhile, when foreign partners did not transfer the product technological know-how 
actively, the indigenous SOEs also dramatically lost the motivation to conduct their 
independent product R&D and production activities. Because local private investors were 
regulated out of this game, with their franchise obtained from the government, the only 
important way to guarantee good profits for a Chinese SOE was to pick up a good foreign 
partner. By sharing the profits of the joint ventures, the SOEs earned a lot of money 
without making any significant cooperative or independent efforts. In this situation, the 
SOEs refused to risk investing in R&D and developing independent products. Step by 
step, the SOEs became weaker and weaker in technological capabilities and brand 
creation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THIRD PHASE (2001–2007) 
Regulation Liberation and Impacts (2001–2004) 
After China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese 
government started to reform its automotive industry policies and loosen the industrial 
regulations in accordance with its WTO obligations. Consequently, some transformative 
changes occurred.  
As illustrated in Table 7, the tariff rate for imported entire cars was lowered to 
30% on January 1st, 2005, and scheduled to drop to 25% by July 1st, 2006. The tariff for 
automotive components and parts decreased to 30% first and was scheduled to lower to 
10% after July 2006. The historical automotive import quota increased by 20% per year 
and was scheduled to phase out by 2006. Even though joint venture style cooperation was 
still mandatory for MNCs in the automotive industry, the local content rate was no longer 
required after 2002. More foreign and indigenous private investors were allowed to 
operate automotive businesses in China, especially in the passenger car market.  
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Table 7. Tariffs, Pre- and Post-WTO Membership 
 Before WTO entry After WTO entry 
Tariffs 200% in 1980s, 80–100% in 1990s 25% for CBU importation and 10% for 
parts and components importation after 
July 2006. 
Import quotas 30,000 vehicles per year allowed 
from foreign carmakers 
Quota increased by 20% per year, 
phased out by 2006 
Local content 
requirements 
40% in first year of production, 
increasing to 60% and 80% in second 
and third years, respectively 
No local content ratio requirement after 
2002 
Auto financing for 
Chinese domestic 
customers 
Foreign, nonbank financial 
institutions prohibited from providing 
financing 
Foreign, nonbank financing permitted 
in selected cities before gradual 
national rollout after 2002 
Foreign participation 
in sales and 
distribution 
Limited to wholesaling through JVs; 
prohibited from consolidating sales 
organizations of imports, JVs 
By 2011 be allowed to own vehicle 
wholesale, retail organizations, 
integrated sales organizations 
Source: Gao (2002) and materials from Chinese Automotive Yearbook 2008 and translated by author. 
Because of the policy changes and the huge potential market in China, nearly all 
the major international carmakers entered the Chinese automotive market. More 
diversified car models were been introduced, in comparison with the oligopoly era before 
2000, when there were only a few models available. And a complex partnership structure 
between local and international firms was established gradually in this period, as shown 
in Figure 3, below. All these transformations increased the competition in the domestic 
market and drove firms (including international joint ventures, the state-owned firms, and 
local private firms) to promote their product quality and design, decrease costs, and lower 
prices.  
	  56 
 
Figure 3. Partnership structure between local and international auto firms in China. 
Source: Luo (2006) and 2004 Yearbook of China’s Automotive Industry. 
The Impact of the Reduction of Tariffs 
Price differences have had an impact on the Chinese car industry. After tariffs on 
cars were reduced, foreign cars gained price advantages and the prices of domestic cars 
categorized in the same grade were significantly higher than the prices of foreign cars in 
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the same category. Overall, the higher the category and price of car, the larger the gap in 
price between foreign and domestic. 
Comparing prices is also very complicated. The domestic car market had been 
regulated by the Chinese government over such a long term that it was insufficient where 
competition is concerned. Under these circumstances, domestic car profits were much 
higher than foreign car profits. Because of this, comparing the sales prices of the cars did 
not accurately reflect the changes that the tariffs had created. 
It is found that price determines the competitiveness of a car model. If the average 
price differences between domestic and foreign cars are less than the tariff on foreign 
cars, the competitiveness of domestic cars is weakened, and vice versa. For example, 
after 2006, the tariff on cars was reduced to 25%; if the average difference between 
domestic and foreign cars in the same grade is less than 25%, the domestic cars will not 
be influenced in the price competition. It means the domestic cars’ competitiveness 
depends on not only tariff but also the total cost of a car. Also, the impacts on domestic 
high-grade and low-grade cars were different. When the average tariff was reduced to 
25% in 2006, it was possible that high-grade cars were at a disadvantage while low-grade 
cars were still competitive. The tendency may have been that the competitiveness of 
domestic low-grade cars would improve through intensive competition while the 
reduction of cost and price of high-grade cars would not be compatible with the reduction 
of tariff. Consequently, foreign cars dominate the high-grade car market and domestic 
cars dominated low-grade car market. 
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The Impact of the Change of Car Import Quota 
After 2001, the quota of import cars and car parts increased yearly by 20%, based 
on a figure of $6 billion. In 2006, the quota was cancelled, meaning that the import quota 
of 300,000 cars per year would no longer be in effect. “However, car production volume 
is just 605,000 in 2000. The import quota is about 50% of annual car production volume” 
(Guo, 2003). Because of this, the import quota on cars in China produced a strong 
challenge for the domestic automobile companies.  
Because the average tariff on cars was still high before 2006, the prices of foreign 
cars were still higher in the Chinese domestic car market. Even though foreign cars were 
expensive, as a whole, foreign cars were superior to domestic cars in terms of 
performance and integral quality. However, domestic cars may have been at a 
disadvantage in the quality competition. Despite greater quality, foreign cars could not 
have a great impact on domestic cars even if the import quota were cancelled. Under that 
circumstance, because of the price advantage of domestic cars caused by the high tariff, 
the impact of quality advantage of foreign cars was limited. But things changed when the 
average tariff on foreign cars was reduced to 25%, and foreign cars had an impact on 
domestic ones in terms of both price and quality; domestic cars without protection from 
import quota were heavily pressured. Especially in the high-grade car market, the market 
share of foreign cars boosted. The influence of cancellation of quota appeared. 
The Impact of Opening the Chinese Car Industry to Foreign Investment 
Besides the positive changes on the supply side (manufacturer), the demand side 
(consumer) also served as a key driver for Chinese automotive market growth at that 
time. The increase in income in the metropolitan areas and the rise of an affluent middle 
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class made private purchasing become the mainstream of auto consumption. The 
upgraded products attracted the enthusiasm of potential car consumers and drove the auto 
market growth. From 2001 to 2004, the average annual growth rate of motor vehicle 
production in China was as high as 23.5 percent—much higher than that in the 1990s 
(12.6 percent). In 2004 alone, the output of motor vehicles in the country totaled 8.9 
million units, more than four times that in 2000. The growth of passenger car production 
was even more astonishing after China entered the WTO in 2001. Total output had 
increased by nearly one million units in each year since 2002—an annual growth rate of 
34.3 percent.  
At the same time, side effects also emerged. Due to the fast market growth and 
rich profit in China, almost all the global carmakers as well as the domestic auto groups 
expanded their capacities in China. Hence, a rather low capacity utilization rate was 
induced in the Chinese automotive industry. Capacity utilization is a vital performance 
measure of the capital-intensive automotive industry and very sensitive for determining 
companies’ financial turnouts (Holweg and Pil, 2004). As shown in Table 8, the capacity 
utilization in the auto industry is only 50% to 60%, far below the average utilization in 
the western automotive industry of around 80% (Holweg, Luo and Oliver, 2005). The 
capacity utilization of the indigenous firms is incredibly low, at 20%. 
Table 8. Capacity Utilization Rate of the Chinese Automotive Industry 
Type of automaker Capacity utilization rate 
International joint venture plants 70.1% 
Independent plants of top five SOEs 50.4% 
Indigenous local private firms 20.2% 
Industry average 51.3% 
Source: Matthias, Luo and Oliver (2005). 
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Even in this situation, most manufacturers were still expanding their facilities in 
China. Global automakers, including Volkswagen and GM, continued adding investment 
and tried to double their annual production capacity in China. Local private carmaker 
Geely also planned to increase its capacity from 210,000 to 650,000 by 2007 (KPMG, 
2004). Perhaps it believed that sustainable growth in the future could help the company 
deal with this problem.  
During this period, new policies were not made. Thus, the automotive market 
growth was driven merely by regulation liberation and country’s overall economic 
growth. The trend in domestic automakers was to promote technology spillover and 
learning by doing. On the other hand, we should also note that severe overcapacity started 
to bring negative effects to the Chinese automotive market. 
New Automotive Policy and Effects (2004–2007) 
New Automotive Policy 
In order to bring policy in line with China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership obligations, China set out a roadmap for the industry’s development in 
“Chinese Automotive Industry Policies 2004”. It was released by China’s State 
Development and Reform Commission (Appendix B is the summary of “Chinese 
Automotive Industry Policies 2004”). Consisting mainly of 12 chapters, the new policy 
superseded the previous policy that had been in place for about 10 years and which had 
become increasingly outmoded. The new auto policy was directed at achieving a degree 
of rationalization among the domestic manufacturers and cultivating a number of 
efficient export-led auto companies.  
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Encouragement policy 
The 2004 China automotive industry policy offered encouragement and strategic 
direction, rather than just strict regulation. The new policy encouraged local private firms 
to join global competition and it was expected that global components would be produced 
in China not only for the domestic market, but also for exporting to North America, 
Europe, and Japan (Holweg, 2006). This indicates a significant change in the role of the 
government in economic matters, as it was now committed to using market forces to 
influence the industry’s future rather than government-prescriptive policies.  
Moreover, under the new policy, R&D expenses were tax deductible in order to 
encourage local R&D activities and the development of indigenous intellectual property. 
And there were also several measures that provided incentives for local component 
production and sourcing.  
On the demand side, policy supported private car purchases by encouraging the 
development of various auto-related sectors such as financing and insurance. A fair and 
open market for both manufacturers and consumers would be strengthened by the 
application of standard nationwide administrative and registration fees in lieu of various 
local government levies. In developing the secondhand car market, related government 
units were required to cooperate on matters such as standardizing transaction charges. 
FDI and importation policy 
In the meantime, the new policy still retained some restrictions on foreign 
investment and some limitations on vehicle and parts imports. Under the new policy, 
foreign investment in vehicle assembly projects continued to be capped at a maximum of 
50 percent. For vehicle assembly projects geared to export and located in an export-
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processing zone, foreign investment of more than 50 percent was permitted, subject to the 
State Council’s endorsement. This cap was not required to be reduced under China’s 
WTO commitments and was an effective way for China to retain a significant stake in the 
sector and to assist the larger domestic manufacturers.  
To curb overinvestment in the sector, existing dormant vehicle production 
companies could not transfer their manufacturing licenses to nonautomotive enterprises. 
At the same time, a higher entry barrier with a minimum investment size of RMB 2 
billion (US$241 million) was stipulated for nonauto companies to enter the industry in 
the new policy. The Chinese government also started to implement selected economic 
cooling-down policies, including discouraging bank lending and slowing approval for 
investments. In addition to these macroadjustments, consequent lower lending from the 
banks and frequent price cuts reduced demand—many price-sensitive Chinese consumers 
delayed buying cars as prices continued to fall. All of these policies (both foreign and 
local) would help China to reduce overinvestment that could result in overcapacity in the 
automotive sector. 
Regarding the import limitation, beginning in 2005, imported vehicles could no 
longer be stored in bonded warehouses in China. That means import duties would be 
collected at the time vehicles landed in China, and imported parts would be charged the 
same level of import tariffs as complete vehicles. The policy demonstrates the 
government’s desire to monitor and shape growth in this sector. Moreover, in 2005, in 
order to stem the tide of CKD imports by MNCs, the Chinese government announced a 
new regulation on the import of automotive parts and components. If 60 percent or more 
of the parts and components used in a vehicle assembled in China were imported, then 
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CKD imports were treated as CBUs (i.e., a 25 percent tariff would be applied). 
Furthermore, imports of the following items were also being treated as CBUs: 
engine/chassis assemblies; assemblies consisting of transmission, steering, braking, front-
axle, and rear-axle components; and assemblies consisting either of the engine or chassis 
in combination with three of the aforementioned five components (GACC, 2005). 
The Effects of New Automotive Policy 
During this phase, according to Dunning and Narula (1996), there should be an 
increased rate of growth of outward FDI and a gradual slowdown in inward FDI. The 
ownership advantages of local private firms are increasingly associated with the property 
of intangible assets and less dependent on government policies. But the role of the 
government is still relevant and oriented towards a reduction of market failures and 
inefficient industries—as well as towards promoting an increasing integration of local 
and foreign companies, which minimize the delocalization risks. The main objectives of 
the incentives are to attract FDI in activities in which local companies do not have 
competitive advantages, as well as to stimulate domestic firms to exploit their own 
advantages in new markets. 
Due to the encouragement policy and the intense competition in the automotive 
industry, international carmakers started to consider conducting more local design and 
development jobs in China. For example, the new 2006 Buick LaCrosse Chinese version 
was a model completely designed by PATAC in Shanghai, the joint venture R&D center 
of GM and SAIC. The deeper technological spillover effect began to take place on 
indigenous carmakers, including SOEs and joint ventures.  
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By accumulating earnings during the golden years of the market boom from 2001 
to 2004 and the under the support of new governmental encouragement policies, local 
carmakers began to develop or acquire car designs individually or by cooperating with 
international designers. For example, domestic automakers Geely and Chery were 
dedicated to joint product development with international technology companies like 
AVL, Pininfarina, Ricardo, and Bertone (Luo, 2005a). Finally, Chery jointly developed 
18 up-to-date engine models from 0.8L to 4.2L with AVL, and all these engines met the 
Euro IV emission standard. Chery fully owned the intellectual property of these engines. 
But the ambitious policy is also a poison to indigenous carmakers; in order to rapidly 
capture market share, indigenous carmakers started to use other companies’ technological 
skills without any authorization. Afterwards, intellectual property disputes arose, and 
many indigenous automakers were accused of copyright infringement.  
New restrictions in the new automotive policy also helped China reduce 
overcapacity, reduce overinvestment, and protect the rationalization of the local auto 
market. Consequently, until 2007 China was the third-largest country in motor vehicle 
production, trailing only Japan and the United States. The number of passenger cars on 
the road in China had increased from about 6 million in 2000 to over 29 million in 2007 
(China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2008). But it led to a trade dispute between China 
and the European Union, the United States, and Canada. The latter three jointly lodged a 
complaint against China with the WTO in September 2006 and demanded an 
investigation into China’s new regulation on imports of parts and components. On the 
other side, the Chinese government made a concession, postponing the implementation of 
the new regulation by two years.  
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During this period, since joining the WTO and developing domestic carmakers’ 
technological capability, the Chinese carmakers started to export cars to some 
undeveloped or developing countries. We can see China had already made some progress 
in the automotive industry from 2005 to 2007.  
But that progress could not meet the extremely ambitious objectives of the new 
policy made by the central government. The Chinese government aimed to encourage 
self-reliant product development and local brand development, building up a few famous 
brands at world-level (top 500) automotive groups before 2010. The Chinese government 
also hoped China would become one of the major global automotive production 
countries, and exporting in large volumes. During this period, since joining the WTO and 
developing domestic carmakers’ technological capabilities, the Chinese carmakers started 
to export cars to some undeveloped or developing countries, and vehicle production in 
China rose rapidly. Thus China had already made some progress in the automotive 
industry from 2005 to 2007. At this stage, we could see the policies were quite similar to 
Lall’s ISI restructuring strategies. According to Lall, the main policy tool was trade 
liberalization or strong export incentives, and this led to considerable upgrading of these 
industries—the main agents in China were domestic enterprises, and in other countries, 
they were MNCs (Lall, 2003). On the other hand, we should note that production was still 
mainly to serve the expansion of the domestic market, and exports were still limited. In 
2007, around 6 million vehicles were produced, but the vehicle export volume was only 
614,412, as noted in Table 9. The main export destinations were Southeast Asia, Latin 
America, Africa, the Middle East, and some other developing countries, as noted in 
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Figure 4.16 Among the international automakers, Honda was the only one that largely 
exported vehicles manufactured in China to overseas markets. In 2005, 11,047 Jazz, 
which were produced in the joint venture owned by Honda, GAIG, and Dongfeng, were 
exported to Europe. We should also note that in this joint venture, Honda had 65 percent 
ownership. The foreign ownership cap of 50% did not apply to the exportation-oriented 
joint venture (Luo, 2005). Besides international carmakers, domestic carmakers Geely 
and Chery also exported overseas in low volume. Geely exported 29,067 cars in 2007 to 
some less developed countries. Chery sold only about 18,000 cars in overseas markets 
until 2007 (China Automotive Yearbook 2008). Low automobile export volume was 
mostly due to the limited quality and brand power of the Chinese products. Besides direct 
exports, the domestic automakers set up CKD plants jointly with other developing 
countries, including Egypt, Viet Nam, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Assembling automobiles 
in developing countries could help China skip the import tariff and benefit from cheaper 
land and labor. But compared to the domestic market, the sales volume and profits were 
extremely low in those developing and undeveloped markets, and it partially quenched 
the exportation passion of domestic automakers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 According to data from CATARC, in 2005, 710,540 special vehicles (e.g., forklifts, golf 
vehicles, and all-terrain vehicles) with an engine volume <=1000ml were exported in 2005. 
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Table 9. Chinese Automotive Export Data in 2007 
Company Export volume Export destination 
FAW 28,823  The Middle East, Southeast Asia, Russia  
SAIC 60 Chile 
Dongfeng 9,172 The Middle East, Southeast Asia  
ChangAn 2,001 Algeria, Thailand, Vietnam, Russia, Zambia, Peru, Morocco, Sri Lanka 
GAIG 43,124 Hong Kong, Europe 
BAIC 14,134 South Africa, Russia, Cuba 
NAC 9,135 Russia, Algeria, Vietnam 
SouthEast 9,478 The Middle East, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe 
Chery 119,891 Russia, Iran, Egypt 
Geely 29,067 Russia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Syria  
GreatWall 28,519 Cuba, Europe 
Zhongxing 10,000 The Middle East, Africa, Russia 
BYD 6,690 Russia, Algeria, Ecuador, Nigeria, Columbia, Egypt, Chile 
Hafei 14,569 The Middle East 
Source: Materials from Chinese Automotive Yearbook 2008 and translated by author. 
 
Figure 4. World distributions of Chinese automotive exports in 2007. Source: Organized 
and translated by author, materials from various Chinese auto magazines. 
In summary, new policy brought both positive and negative effects to China. On 
the one hand, China gained a deeper technological spillover effect from international auto 
companies. And the regulations of the new auto policy to some extent encouraged 
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indigenous automakers to join severe global competition and help them made some kind 
of progress. On the other hand, the new policy still could not be totally in line with WTO 
rules and brought China much trouble. Under this situation, those strategies merely could 
put the industry in a boom period for a very short time, and the boom could not last very 
long. And we should also note that in spite of copying from MNCs, the local firms still 
failed in building their ownership advantages associated with the property of intangible 
assets.  
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CHAPTER SIX: FOURTH PHASE (2008–PRESENT) 
Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on China’s  
Automotive Industry (2008–2009) 
From 2001 to 2007, China enjoyed the benefits brought by joining the WTO. 
However, starting in 2008, the global financial crisis let China experience the side effects 
of entering the WTO. According to export statistics offered by the Chinese General 
Administration of Customs, from January to July 2008, a consistent rapid growth trend 
was shown—but there was an obvious decline starting in August 2008. The decline in 
exports lasted for about five months. The general low export growth in the Chinese 
automotive industry became much worse than before. Especially in November 2008, only 
35,800 cars were exported, which was the lowest export volume in the previous 20 
months. During the whole year, only 681,008 automobiles were exported, and compared 
with the same period in the previous year, exports had declined by 68.1 percent. In 
addition, the $9,633 billion of car exports declined by 53.09 percent when compared with 
the first half of the year; when compared with the same period in the previous year, it had 
been lowered by 101.3 percent. Car component exports, which took a large proportion of 
total export volume, had been lowered by 27.8 percent compared to the same period in 
the previous year, as noted in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Growth Rates of Exports in Chinese Automotive Industry (2001–2008) 
Year 
Growth rate of 
automotive 
products export 
Automotive Automotive component 
Proportion share in 
total export volume 
Export 
growth rate 
Proportion share in 
total export volume 
Export 
growth rate 
2001 18.2 5.0 5.3 95.0 18.9 
2002 19.9 5.0 20.9 95.0 19.8 
2003 34.4 5.6 49.6 94.4 33.6 
2004 68.7 5.4 64.6 94.6 68.9 
2005 54.4 9.1 158.4 90.9 48.5 
2006 43.2 12.6 98.2 87.4 37.7 
2007 46.6 20.0 133.1 80.0 34.1 
2008 11.4 23.6 31.8 76.4 6.3 
Source: Materials from Chinese Automotive Yearbook 2008 and translated by author. 
 One reason for the export volume declining was the auto demand in the major 
auto market, including Europe and North America, decreased sharply; the decrease in 
those developed countries dragged some newborn markets, including Russia and Latin 
America, into depression. Another reason was almost all the countries were busy making 
policies to protect their own economies. Especially in Russia and some other developing 
countries in Latin America, which were the main auto export destination for China, 
governments set severe restrictions and commercial barriers to auto export. Besides that, 
some other factors, such as the appreciation of RMB for both the euro and dollar, led to a 
higher cost of production, and sales restrained the export of China’s automobiles, as 
noted in Figure 5. 
	  71 
 
 
Figure 5. Exchange rates, RMB to euro/dollar (2002–2008). Source: Materials from 
People’s Bank of China and organized by author. 
The global financial crisis can be both an opportunity and a challenge for the 
Chinese automobile industry. On the one hand, when those international automotive 
manufacturers are dealing with their bankruptcy risks in other automotive markets, 
Chinese indigenous automakers could take a breath from the formerly drastic automobile 
market and can make use of the favorable economic environment and financial support to 
facilitate their product innovation, as well as further develop new markets for their 
investment abroad. On the other hand, due to the dominance of the FDI investment 
pattern in the Chinese automobile industry, local auto companies faced great risks. Due to 
lack of relevant experience in international investment and M&A (mergers and 
acquisitions), local auto companies will suffer from even greater challenges after M&A; 
therefore, they should remain calm when dealing with all these. Besides the external 
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effect of the financial crisis, China was still faced with policy-related problems—Chinese 
new automotive industry regulations were against WTO rules. In July 2008, the WTO 
ruled that China had violated its WTO commitments in this case, and its new regulation 
on imports of automotive parts and components was illegal (Wall Street Journal, July 
2008).  
To summarize, the good thing is, even though the global financial crisis allowed 
the general low export rate in China to worsen, the auto sales in the domestic auto market 
still kept going up. The crisis created a favorable industrial atmosphere for indigenous 
auto companies. The bad thing is, China would meet with more challenges after the 
global financial crisis, including lack of experience in international investment and M&A 
(mergers and acquisitions), competing with stronger international rivals, as well as facing 
a much more free automobile market after the abolition of policy restrictions. 
Policy Revision and its Effects (2009–Present) 
To be in accordance with WTO rules, Chinese automobile policies were revised 
again. In September 2009, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) was compelled to cancel all the policies regarding CKD import and localization 
of foreign products. Until now, a much more free automobile market had been built in 
China, and China decided to achieve progress in the automobile industry by using export-
oriented policy and endeavoring to upgrade domestic automotive firms. 
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In 2009, due to the big changes in China’s automotive industry environment, the 
NDRC announced a three-year plan. It contained eight development goals for the auto 
industry from 2009 through 2011. These five goals are summarized below.17 
Export Policy and Goals 
In order to enlarge the automotive component export market, the NDRC made the 
Chinese exports the first goal of the new policy. Accordingly, auto parts export volume 
was set to achieve a 10% average annual growth rate from 2009 to 2011. By 2015, total 
auto products’ export value was expected to be up to $85 billion and achieve a 20 percent 
average annual growth rate after that. By 2020, China’s total automotive export value 
would constitute a 10 percent proportion of the world’s total automotive trade value.  
Goal of auto parts manufacture upgrade 
Expand capacity of indigenous auto parts manufacturing through mergers and 
restructuring with other local automakers, while seeking technological independence in 
key auto parts and systems such as engine transmission, steering, braking, drive train, 
suspension, and vehicle control. Encourage Chinese auto parts companies to take a place 
in the world auto parts supply chain. 
Goal of auto manufacture upgrade 
Encourage the competitive indigenous auto manufacturers to improve automotive 
research and development through domestic cooperation. Call for the overall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 China Automotive Review, “Automotive revitalization plan requires 10 percent growth in next 
three years,” April 28, 2009, http://www.chinaautomotivereview.com/pub/CARArticle.aspx?ID=3620; “汽
车产业调整和振兴规划” (March 20, 2009) on the official website of The Central People’s Government of 
the People’s Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-03/20/content_1264324.htm#, as viewed on 
August 19, 2009. The US-China Business Council released a brief English-language summary, “USCBC 
Summary of the PRC Auto Industry Revitalization Plan.” Translated by Rachel Tang. 
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improvement in automotive technologies, including greater fuel efficiency, development 
of new energy sources, and safety features. Develop a number of measures to reduce fuel 
consumption, including rising fuel prices and reducing taxes on smaller vehicles,18 and 
starting a pilot program to offer incentives to taxi and other fleet operators if they 
purchase alternative-energy vehicles.19 And encourage indigenous automakers participate 
in the world competition by acquiring foreign brands. Improve automotive development 
and try to build up a few world-famous Chinese automotive brands. The final goal is to 
increase the domestic market share of Chinese-brand vehicles to at least 40%, with about 
10% of vehicle exports made by local Chinese automakers; emphasis would be on 
intellectual property protection. 
Goal of auto industry restructuring 
In order to achieve lower cost, promote efficient resource allocation and enhance 
the competitiveness of the indigenous automakers. Making progress on industry 
consolidation and restructuring is encouraged. This policy aims to consolidate the current 
14 major auto manufacturing groups, which command more than 90% of market share, 
into 10 such groups; to form 2 to 3 large auto groups with an annual capacity of over 
2 million units; and form 4 to 5 smaller groups with annual production capacity of over 
1 million units.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Industry Report: Automotive, July 2009.” 
19 Automotive News, “2009 Guide to China’s Auto Market,” April 27, 2009, p. 20. The incentives 
are reported to be a  fixed amount of $8,770 for an electric car and up to $7,310 for a hybrid.  
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Goal of protecting the natural environment 
Aiming to protect the natural environment in China, the new policy promotes 
optimizing the auto market demand structure so that small passenger cars with engine 
displacements of under 1.5 liters account for more than 40% of the market, while cars 
under 1.1 liters will comprise over 15% of the market. Increase production capacity of 
new-energy vehicles to 500,000 units, whose sales volume should account for 5% of total 
passenger cars, and create an infrastructure to support electric vehicles. Increase auto 
consumption with a reasonable system of taxes and fees. Offer subsidies and low 
shopping taxes (5%) to raise the enthusiasm of the potential consumer toward small 
passenger cars with engine displacements of under 1.6 liters. The traditional policy theme 
of “foreign investment” in automobile manufacturing was removed from the “encouraged” 
category. At the same time, alternative-energy vehicles had been moved up to the 
“encouraged” category.20 
China’s new automotive policies were mainly categorized in two parts: 
“promoting exports” and “upgrading China’s auto industry.” As noted above, “upgrading 
China’s auto industry” included an auto parts manufacture upgrade, an auto manufacture 
upgrade,  and auto industry restructuring. Now, we will introduce the “promoting exports” 
policy. 
Those policies are also in line with Dunning’s fourth phase of IDP theory. 
According the Dunning, stage four of IDP is distinguished by a shift to a positive NOI 
position, as outward FDI stock exceeds inward FDI stock. This happens because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The Wall Street Journal, “China Downshifts on Autos, Boosts Energy in Foreign-Investment 
Review,” December 31, 2011. 
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domestic firms’ ownership-advantages develop, which allows them not only to compete 
locally with foreign firms but also to expand their activity abroad. These increased 
investments abroad are motivated by the search for new markets and cheap labor forces 
in countries at lower stages of development. That part of the theory is in line with China’s 
“promoting exports” policy. At this stage, the country location advantages, traditionally 
associated with a cheap labor force and natural resources, began to be based mainly on 
created assets (sophisticated markets, qualified labor, technological capacity of the more 
dynamic sectors, and development of economies of agglomeration). The production 
processes became more capital-intensive, reflecting a lower cost of capital compared with 
the cost of labor. That part of theory is in line with China’s “upgrading China’s auto 
industry” policy. 
The implication of export policy 
In 1989, China exported just six cars. Today, as noted in Table 11, the number of 
vehicles exported is almost one million, and the ratio of the number of vehicles exported 
to total vehicle production in China has increased in the past few years. And in general, 
the increase in total vehicle production as well as the increasing ratio indicates big 
development in Chinese auto exports. 
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Table 11. Ratio of Number of Vehicles Exported to Total Vehicle Production in 
China (2009–2013) 
Year Number of vehicles exported from China (A) Total vehicle production in China (B) A/B 
2009 370,000 13,790,990 2.68% 
2010 566,700 18,264,760 3.10% 
2011 849,800 18,418,880 4.61% 
2012 1,056,100 19,271,800 5.48% 
2013 977,300 22,116,800 4.42% 
Source: China Automotive Industry Year Book 2009 to 2013; OICA (International Organization of Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers), World Motor Vehicle Production by Country 2009–2013; ratios calculated by 
author. 
But all of this progress could not meet the Chinese government’s ambitions. 
According to the first Chinese export goal made by the NDRC in 2009, by 2015 total 
auto products’ export value should be up to $85 billion and achieve a 20 percent average 
annual growth rate after that. By 2020, China’s total automotive export value should 
constitute 10 percent of the world’s total automotive trade value; however, as noted in 
Table 12, until 2013 the export value of auto products from China was $12.91 billion, and 
the ratio of export value of auto products in China to export value of auto products 
worldwide was merely 1.058 percent. Apparently, the export goal was too high for the 
Chinese auto industry. 
Table 12. Ratio of Export Values of Auto Products in China to Export Values of 
Auto Products Worldwide (2009–2013) 
Year 
Export values of auto products from China 
(billion U.S. dollars) (E) 
Export values of auto products 
worldwide (billion U.S. dollars) (F) E/F 
2009 5.19 846.681 0.613% 
2010 6.98 1091.975 0.639% 
2011 10.95 1286.614 0.851% 
2012 13.71 1295.298 1.058% 
2013 12.91 – – 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2013 and Word and Regional Export Profiles 2009 to 2012. 
Ratios calculated by author. 
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The low export value of auto products from China was caused by the low average 
export price for both vehicles and auto parts. According to statistics from CAAM, the 
average export price for a passenger car from China was about $7,300 in 2013, and for 
commercial vehicles, about $22,252. The export price of brand new Chinese passenger 
cars was even lower than that of Japanese second-hand passenger cars. And the average 
export price of commercial cars in China was as little as one-tenth of those made in the 
United States. The rush to sell low-cost cars overseas brings quality concerns, and an 
earlier attempt to export Chinese-branded vehicles to Eastern Europe ended in disaster 
after a dismal failure in crash tests.21 After that, even though SAIC and Geely won high 
marks in crash tests by a European safety agency, changing foreign customers’ 
perspectives toward China-branded cars and overhauling brand image will take time.  
Moreover, export destinations for Chinese vehicle exports did not change much. 
In 2013, as noted in Figure 6, Algeria, Russia, and other developing or undeveloped 
countries were still the main export destinations of China-branded vehicles. Brazil, which 
is also a developing country and aimed to boost its car exports just like China, had 
exported a lot of cars to some developed countries in 2012, including 1,504,364 cars to 
the United States, 212,792 cars to Europe, and 160,086 cars to Canada.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Economist, “Chinese carmakers still in second gear,” May 5, 2012. 
22 Data from PwC, AMIA Auto Research, 2012. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of Chinese vehicle exports in 2013, by country of destination. 
Source: Data from China Automotive Yearbook 2013 and organized by author. 
In spite of the low export vehicle volume, a higher number of vehicles that were 
imported into China sharply decreased the profit of China in international vehicle trade. 
As shown in Table 13, there was an apparent trade deficit in the Chinese auto industry. 
From 2009 to 2013, the gap was gradually increased. That was an abnormal phenomenon 
for the world’s largest exporter. 
Table 13. Ratio of Number of Vehicles Imported to Number of Vehicle Sales in 
China (2009–2013) 
Year Number of vehicles imported into China (C) Number of vehicle sales in China (D) C/D 
2009 420,696 13,640,000 3.08% 
2010 771,431 18,060,000 4.27% 
2011 1,003,459 18,500,000 5.42% 
2012 1,091,309 19,310,000 5.65% 
2013 1,171,000 21,990,000 5.33% 
Source: China Automotive Industry Year Book 2009 to 2013. Ratios calculated by author. 
Although the Chinese government policies are quite similar to Dunning’s fourth 
phase in IDP, in the case study of the Chinese automotive industry, due to the unreliable 
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brand image of some local Chinese manufacturers, low vehicle quality, and immediate-
gratification culture in local governments and SOEs, the ambitious export goal will not be 
achieved by Chinese indigenous automakers by 2020.  
Auto Industry Upgrade Policy and Effects 
In order to achieve the upgrade of the Chinese auto industry, after 2009 
indigenous auto firms and the Chinese government tried three measures, including M&A, 
building up local brands, and making an auto policy oriented to environmental protection. 
All those upgrading policies were quite similar to Lall’s autonomous strategy; those 
strategies used extensive industrial policies, reaching into trade, finance, education, 
training,  technology, and industry structure. These will be illustrated below. 
Auto industry upgrade—M&A 
Compared to previous auto policies, one transformative strategy that related to the 
auto industry upgrade in 2009 auto policies is the encouragement of domestic automakers 
to acquire foreign brands. To illustrate that policy, two iconic cases will be discussed. 
The first one is Geely buys Volvo and the second one is Chinese-Japanese Group 
acquires Saab. In March 2010, China’s largest privately owned automaker, Zhejiang 
Geely Automobile Holdings Group (Geely), completed acquisition of Volvo from the 
Ford Motor Company. Geely paid $1.8 billion, a fraction of the $6.45 billion that Ford 
paid for Volvo in 1999.23 Geely reportedly planned to retain the Volvo management, 
headquarters, and manufacturing facilities in Sweden and Belgium. Ford would continue 
to supply components to Volvo for an unspecified period. Ford’s China joint venture, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The Economist, “Devolving Volvo,” March 28, 2010. 
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Chang’an Ford Mazda Automobile Co., still produces the Volvo S40 and S80 under 
contract with Volvo.24 
Even though Geely has completed the acquisition of Volvo, which is in line with 
the objective of the new Chinese auto policy, the Chinese central government still sees 
Volvo as a foreign entity. To follow China’s investment rules, Volvo will establish a 
50/50 joint venture with its Chinese parent company—Geely—to get government 
approval to produce cars in China. Volvo will also follow China’s requirement that 
foreign automakers help Chinese partners develop an indigenous brand of cars and 
develop electric cars.25 In March 2012, Geely and Volvo signed a technology transfer 
agreement, under which the two automakers would discuss specific ways Geely could 
take technology that Volvo planned to phase out over the next several years. This could 
help Geely, the Chinese maker of low-cost cars, to enrich its product portfolio and 
become more competitive in its home market.26 However, in addition to the risks of brand 
dilution for Volvo, questions remain about whether Chinese auto companies like Geely 
would be able to build upon acquired technology, come up with its own design, and 
eventually move up the manufacturing value chain as a world-class car maker.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The Telegraph, “Geely Completes Acquisition of Volvo,” August 3, 2010; The Wall Street 
Journal, “Geely Sets Second Volvo China Plant,” June 24, 2011. 
25 Automotive News China, “Volvo to Establish Joint Venture with Geely, Aims to Produce 
Vehicles in China,” February 24, 2012. 
26 Automotive News, “Geely Signs Technology Transfer Deal with Volvo,” March 9, 2012; 
Reuters, “China’s Geely Hopes go Get Volvo JV Approval in H1,” March 22, 2012; Reuters, “Volvo 
Technology Transfer a Lifeline for Geely,” April 21, 2012. 
27 Congressional Research Service, “China’s Auto Sector Development and Policies: Issues and 
Implications,” by Rachel Tang, June 25, 2012. p.17. 
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In early 2010, after GM had gone through restructuring, it sold Saab to Spyker 
Cars NV, a Dutch boutique sports car maker, which then renamed itself Swedish 
Automotive NV. However, Saab remained vulnerable because of its small size, little 
access to credit, and dependence on others for key technology, especially at a time when 
the global auto industry was undergoing restructuring and a slow recovery.28 As shown in 
Table 14, in September 2011, Saab filed for bankruptcy protection, under which it failed 
to reorganize afterwards. In December 2011, because of the failure of the acquisition, 
Saab filed for bankruptcy again and entered receivership, setting the stage for liquidation. 
The failure was mostly due to the disagreement with Saab’s former owner, General 
Motors Co. GM stated its concerns that the key technology it had licensed to Saab would 
be transferred to China and could hurt GM’s business there.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The Wall Street Journal, “Saab Auto Will Restructure,” September 8, 2011; Financial Times, 
“Saab Files for Bankruptcy as Fundraising is Blocked,” December 20, 2011; The Wall Street Journal, 
“Saab Automobile, 1950-2011,” December 20, 2011. These Chinese firms include Hawtai Motor Group, 
Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile Co. (Zhejiang Youngman), and Pang Da Automobile Trade Co., a 
Chinese auto dealership network. 
29 Ibid. 
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Table 14. The Process of SAAB Acquisition 
Date Process 
May 2011 Pangda Automobile Trade Co. Ltd planned to acquire a 24 percent share stake 
from Swedish Automotive NV. 
June 2011 Pangda Automobile Trade Co. Ltd and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile 
Co. signed a memorandum of cooperation with SAAB, 245 million euros would 
be used to acquire 53.9% share stake from Swedish Automotive NV. 
September 23, 2011 Saab filed for bankruptcy again and entered receivership. 
October 28, 2011 Pangda Automobile Trade Co. Ltd, and Zhejiang Youngman Lotus Automobile 
Co. signed a memorandum of understanding with Swedish Automotive NV; 
those two Chinese auto companies decided to acquire a 100 percent share stake 
of SAAB with 100 million euros. 
December 19, 2011 Sweden announced its approval of Saab’s bankruptcy application. The 
acquisition of Saab failed. 
Source: Materials from Chinese automotive industry Yearbook and auto websites. Process organized and 
translated by the author. 
Finally, in June 2012, a Chinese-Japanese investment group agreed to buy Saab at 
an undisclosed price and to convert the bankrupt automaker into a maker of electric cars. 
The purchasing group consisted of Hong Kong-based renewable-energy power plant 
builder National Modern Energy Holdings Ltd., which owned 51%, and the Japanese 
investment firm, Sun Investment.30 
To summarize, besides feeling pleased with the acquisition success of Geely, 
China should pay more attention to the Saab acquisition case, which taught a lesson to the 
indigenous Chinese automotive companies. GM strong objection to making deals with 
potential Chinese investors means the intellectual property right issues have destroyed the 
Chinese auto companies’ credit record. It also indicated there would be a lot of barriers to 
building a world-famous Chinese automotive brand as well as exporting “made in China” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Bloomberg.com, “Saab Auto Sold to China-Japan Group in Electric-Car Push,” June 13, 2012. 
Zhejiang Youngman had been in talks since February 2012 and made a revised bid of more than 4 billion 
Swedish kronor ($567 million) in June 2012. 
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automobiles in some developed countries that emphasized protection of intellectual 
property rights. 
Auto industry upgrade—build up local brands 
It was not the first time that the central government endeavored to build local 
brands. As Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2008 states, “although China’s 11th five-year 
plan (2006–2010) for the auto industry included an article requiring such development of 
indigenous brands, it was not officially promulgated in early 2007 as originally 
scheduled.”31 The aim of the 12th five-year plan32 for the auto sector was stated as to 
“improve domestic automakers capability to produce complete vehicles, in addition to 
auto parts, and to develop indigenous capacity to produce key components.”33 Based on 
the rapid growth of the Chinese automotive industry and the apparent ambitions of 
domestic automakers, it could be a good time for the Chinese government to be more 
aggressive in promoting the creation of indigenous brands by domestic firms, especially 
through some Chinese partners in foreign joint ventures.  
To build up local auto brands, the Chinese government applied two measures. 
One was promoting mergers and acquisitions among state-owned companies. From 
China’s perspective, consolidation and restructuring could achieve the low-cost 
promotion and efficient resource allocation, improve the competitiveness of indigenous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2008, p. 38. 
32 Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, on the official website 
of The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China; see http://www.gov.cn/2011lh 
/content_1825838.htm, as viewed on April 18, 2012. Five-year plans are a series of social and economic 
development plans issued by the central government as the overall principles directing the country. 
33 Congressional Research Service, “China’s Auto Sector Development and Policies: Issues and 
Implications,” by Rachel Tang, June 25, 2012. p. 25. 
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automakers, as well as strengthen technological cooperation. Consequently, it could help 
China to build up strong indigenous automotive brands. Under this encouragement, most 
mergers and acquisitions took place among state-owned auto companies. For example, 
Chang’an acquired two state-owned carmakers; and Jiangxi Changhe Automotive Co. 
and Hafei Automobile Industry Group Co. SAIC acquired Nanjing Automobile Group.34  
In contrast to Japan and Korea’s autonomous strategies for building indigenous 
auto brands, which shut foreigners out of their domestic markets and gave domestic 
brands a captive audience to practice on, China let in the foreign carmakers and pinned 
hope on them to help China build up indigenous brands. Foreign auto companies wishing 
to build new plants or to add capacity have been advised by the government to develop a 
local car brand, establish R&D facilities for their Chinese joint ventures, and add electric 
vehicles to their product lineups.35 For example, a local brand was “part of the deal” in 
Peugeot Citroen’s new joint venture with Chinese carmaker Chang’an. That kind of deal 
also occurred with Volkswagen, Honda Motors, and General Motors. Under the pressure, 
Honda Motors launched the Everus S1, which is a previous model of the Honda Fit, for 
its Chinese partner, Guangqi Automobile Co. The car model was sold via the exact same 
dealership network for Honda vehicles, and reportedly merely 2,000 units are sold per 
month. Even though local brands were built in China, the indigenous car brands were 
created not to satisfy market demand, but to meet the central government’s requirements. 
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34 Automotive News China, “Beijing expects 10 automakers to assemble 90% of China’s vehicles 
by 2015,” February 3, 2012 
35 Yang Jian, Automotive News China, “China Joint Ventures’ Baby Brands Face Murky 
Prospects,” April 24, 2012. 
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local government in Liuzhou. For its joint venture, SAIC-GM-Wuling Automobile Co., 
this car model was developed by Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center (PATAC) and 
was priced lower than GM cars. As a low-end, entry-level car, Baojun 630 cars were sold 
and marketed through a whole new dealership network. The Baojun 630 proved more 
successful than Everus S1. In the first three months in 2012, 22,000 units were sold in 
China. Baojun gets full support from international parent companies because the new 
brands are owned by the joint ventures.36 
Overall, the local brand policy failed. One reason is the bosses of state-owned 
Chinese firms treated their jobs as stepping stones to higher political office, moving on to 
a senior party role after five years or so. Thus, most SOEs in China lack motivation to 
foster research and development to lay the foundations for long-term success. Just 
encouraging M&A and consolidation cannot promote true reform among Chinese SOEs. 
Another reason is Chinese carmakers still rely on foreign automakers. Although offering 
subsidies or instituting policy restrictions on foreign partners could help China build local 
brands, none of the foreign manufacturers freely opted for having local brands added to a 
complex brand portfolio that they all already had.37 From the domestic automakers’ 
perspective, Chinese local brands are the low-end brands of international automakers. 
Thus, they also don’t want to support the local Chinese brands. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Yang Jian, Automotive News China, “China Joint Ventures’ Baby Brands Face Murky 
Prospects,” April 24, 2012. 
37 John Reed and Patti Waldmeir, Financial Times, “Foreign Groups Told to Make Chinese Cars,” 
March 20, 2011. 
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Auto industry upgrade—environmental protection policy 
Since 2009, the Chinese government not only cared about market growth in the 
auto industry, but it also started to think about how to deal with the bad effects, including 
increasingly paralyzing traffic conditions and severe air pollution in many cities, that 
were brought by the rapid development of the auto industry. Besides the environmental 
protection oriented policies noted in “Chinese Automotive Policy in 2009,” more will be 
introduced below. 
Vehicle restriction policy 
China overtook the United States as the world’s largest auto market in 2009, as 
the nation’s rising middle class shunned bicycles and public transport and embraced cars 
instead. But Chinese cities have been unable to adapt quickly enough to the rapid rise in 
car use. 
Since 2010, in a bid to ease traffic chaos and curb air pollution, many cities in 
China have considered vehicle restriction policies. In December 2010, Beijing became 
the first city to allocate vehicle license plates using a lottery. Beijing’s municipal 
government limited the issuance of new car and microvan license plates in the city to 
240,000 in 2011, about one-third of this year’s figure, and only registered Beijing 
residents were able to get one. Vehicles that don’t have Beijing license plates were 
banned from entering the main city area during rush hour. After implementing the policy, 
China’s total auto sales rose 26.9% in November 2010 from the same month in 2009, to 
1.7 million units. The strong growth rate was partly due to the expectations of new traffic 
restrictions and the imminent expiration of some incentives for vehicle purchases. Total 
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auto sales in the January to November period in 2010 rose 34.1% from 2009, to 16.4 
million units.  
But in the long run, vehicle restriction policies that restricted vehicle consumption 
in China conflicted with the Chinese automobile industry policy in 2009. Beijing, as the 
capital city, became an example for other cities. Until 2014, four big cities—Guiyang, 
Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Hangzhou—have followed Beijing and implemented different 
kinds of vehicle restriction policies. Especially in Guangzhou, many local residents were 
shocked by the vehicle restriction policy. It was announced on June 30, 2012, and 
implemented on July 1, 2012. As more Chinese cities propose license-plate lotteries or 
other ways of limiting the number of cars on the road, it has become extremely difficult 
to actually get a car, and people sometimes wait years just to get a plate. And after 
obtaining the cherished plate, consumers are responding by buying more expensive 
automobiles with bigger engines. Major Chinese cities with policies designed to reduce 
car purchases to ease pollution and traffic congestion result in first-time car buyers 
skipping less expensive models—usually Chinese brands—starting to think, “putting the 
pricey plate on a more expensive car makes sense.” More and more first-time car buyers 
are buying big cars such as sport-utility vehicles and premium cars. Data from the 
semiofficial China Association of Automobile Manufacturers show that in Beijing, the 
average price per car has surged 88% since 2011, and the market share of cars with 
engines larger than 1.6 liters has grown 17% over the same period. (The Wall Street 
Journal, Aug. 7, 2013) 
According to UBS research, every kilometer of road in China has about 200 
cars—as many as in Los Angeles, which has the worst traffic in the United States. It 
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seems measures that curb car sales will be inevitable. However, Binyam Reja, the World 
Bank’s transport sector coordinator for China, said that in the long run, “more 
comprehensive” policies are needed. This includes going beyond the current regulations 
to include charging people to bring cars to downtown areas during peak hours, improving 
subway lines, developing public transportation, and encouraging the use of energy-
efficient cars (The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 2013).  
Under the vehicle restriction policy, foreign car brands are gaining at the expense 
of local rivals that don’t enjoy the same reputation for quality. The share of Chinese 
brands in passenger vehicles including minivans fell to less than 39% in the first quarter, 
from 43% in 2013, according to the government-backed industry group, China 
Association of Automobile Manufacturers (The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 2014). Also, 
according to UBS, China’s overcapacity in the passenger car market by 2015 could total 
about 8 million cars, most of which would be on the books of domestic automakers. 
Excess capacity has led to a lower rate of capacity utilization and eroded profit margins. 
Unstable government policy as well as lack of a sales market and profit are the big 
hindrances for domestic vehicle companies. 
Cut the quantity of governmental vehicle procurement 
In order to cut vehicle consumption in some big cities, China issued new rules for 
vehicles purchased for official use in November 2011, which lowered the maximum 
amount of public funds that mid-level government officials can spend on vehicles from 
200,000 to 180,000 yuan (about US$28,400). The other reason that the central 
government lowered the maximum amount of public funds is that it wants to urge 
government agencies to buy domestic brands. These new rules also required officials to 
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purchase vehicles with engines smaller than 1.8 liters. The government also added new-
energy vehicles to the list of cars that meet purchase requirements.38 However, these rules 
did not have much effect on governmental vehicle procurement. For example, in order to 
stay in line with those requirements, many foreign automakers introduced new car 
models with a smaller engines and priced the cars a little bit lower. In 2001, the quantity 
of official cars did not decrease sharply, and foreign brands accounted for 80 percent of 
the official vehicle pool.  
In a word, the vehicle restriction policy as well as the government vehicle 
procurement limitation was made to protect the environment, but the result was very 
disappointing. The air pollution and traffic chaos in China become much more severe. 
Especially, in order to defend their own record of achievement and step to higher political 
office, many local government officials started to consider using vehicle restriction 
policies in their cities, which did not have severe pollution and traffic problems. 
Consequently, that kind of lazy governance had extremely bad impacts on the demand 
market. It pushed people, who never thought about car consumption, to buy cars. It 
increased the total car volume in China. And reportedly, car types they bought were 
usually luxury-brand sedans or SUVs, like BMW and Mercedes-Benz. Finally, car sales 
of indigenous automakers dropped sharply.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The Wall Street Journal, “China Targets Bureaucrats’ Car Perks,” November 26–27, 2011. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
Analysis of the Chinese automobile industry was conducted to illustrate the 
intrinsic dynamic linkages between government interventions on MNCs and industrial 
development as well as the influence of economic environments. The main features of the 
overall automobile industry are summarized below. 
With too many manufacturers and poor control of quality, the Chinese automotive 
industry is highly fragmented in terms of the number of manufacturers, geographical 
distribution, and the ownership of manufacturers. This fragmentation led to inefficiency 
of the scale-sensitive automotive production; central or local governments determining 
the allocation of capital to SOEs; historical lack of technological capabilities remaining; 
Chinese SOEs still relying on their foreign partners in joint ventures; MNCs’ brands 
dominating the Chinese car market; a lack of demand-side policies such as lack of 
transparency of information about consumers, especially credit ratings; no clear export 
strategy; and intellectual property concerns that limit the introduction of new technology 
to the market. 
Until 2014, government policies failed to build up a mature domestic auto 
industry with competitiveness at the world level. The industrial policies were created in 
accordance with the theory of FDI, but the practice was unsuccessful in the Chinese 
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automotive industry. In order to explore the reasons for the policy failure and policy 
distortion, an analysis was conducted. The major findings include the following. 
The theory of FDI is based on a dynamic view. Static FDI-dependent policies 
induce negative effects for the industry and the nation, but the policies may also generate 
the “technology spillover effects,” which could benefit the indigenous industry with 
efficiency improvement and capability development. The purpose of the theory is to 
induce the MNCs to help the development of indigenous industry, and the improvement 
of indigenous companies’ internal capabilities is the key to achieve this purpose. 
In the Chinese automotive industry, the oligopoly of MNCs generated by the 
inflow of FDI weakened Chinese partners—and Chinese SOEs’ motivation to learn 
through the technology spillover process. Under this situation, the necessary spillover 
effects were limited, and the intervention policies, both on MNCs and indigenous firms, 
failed to achieve a successful catch-up of the immature industry. 
The main reason for oligopoly and then limited spillover effects was that the 
government only protected SOEs, which were owned by the central government, and let 
the indigenous local firms out of the game. Lack of horizontal competition crushed the 
motivation of SOEs. The overprotection associated with governmental ownership of the 
market players is the main reason for the failure of industrial policies. 
After China entered the WTO, regulation liberation had positive effects on market 
maturation and horizontal competition. But due to the industry fragmentation, the 
weakness of indigenous firms, and unchanged institutional features, establishing a world-
class auto industry is still hard to achieve. 
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Generally speaking, the development phase of the Chinese automotive industry is 
in the ISI restructuring of Lall’s theory and in the fourth phase of Dunning’s theory. It 
still has a long way to go. 
Policy Recommendations 
Based on the failures of the industrial policies and policy distortion, several 
measures are proposed based on the findings. First, our study results pinpointed a number 
of serious challenges stemming from this rapid growth, including higher demand for oil, 
higher pollution levels, and severe traffic problems in cities. The Chinese government has 
to determine how to manage the auto economy without harming its domestic 
manufacturers and suppliers or its environment. Second, mergers and acquisitions 
between the small local efficient firms that belong to different governmental 
administrations should be promoted in order to deal with industry fragmentation and 
improve the efficiency of the scale-sensitive automotive production. Third, government 
policies should be adjusted to be fair to both the SOEs and the local private firms. 
Besides encouraging the indigenous firms to learn from “technology spillover effects,” 
the government should support indigenous industrial innovations with concrete benefits, 
such as tax reductions, subsidies, or preferential loans. Thus, the state would still have an 
important role to play. 
Overall, learning from MNCs and nurturing the capability development of 
indigenous firms (including both SOEs and local firms) are necessary for the 
development of the Chinese automotive industry. Merely relying on spillover effects 
from MNCs would generate harmful effects on the industry. It is also important to note 
that government policy cannot replace market power. It should be a complement to the 
	  94 
deficit of pure market mechanism in optimizing resource allocation and fostering the 
development of indigenous industry. The government should play a role in establishing a 
fair competitive environment and solving conflicts, rather than just acting as a regulator. 
There are questions that remain to be answered through more research in the 
future. These include how government decisions will impact China’s automobile industry 
market structure, joint venture relationships, automotive infrastructure, air quality, and oil 
supply. And there are questions related to policies that impact Chinese manufacturers, 
dealers, and suppliers, and foreign firms seeking market share.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Chinese Automotive Industry Policy 1994 
1 Policy objectives To open up domestic and foreign markets; promotion of large-scale 
production; concentration of the industry, eliminating small-scale, 
dispersed operations 
2 Product approval Automotive enterprises must submit future product plans for approval; 
products which are not approved cannot be sold, imported, or used 
3 Enterprise 
organization 
Formation of automotive industry groups to attain critical mass; state 
support for enterprises that exceed certain production volumes and R&D 
effort 
4 Technology policy Encouragement of independent product development 
5 Investment policy Encouragement of automotive enterprises to raise development funds 
from various sources; transregional and transdepartmental investment to 
support increased industry concentration 
6 Foreign investment 
policy 
Encouragement of joint ventures with foreign partners who meet certain 
conditions (e.g. technology must be 1990s standards; R&D facilities must 
be established; foreign partner must have independent product patents and 
trademarks and have a good capital-raising ability 
7 Import management 
policy 
Restriction of imports; entry points limited to four seaports; prohibition of 
imports of used vehicles 
8 Export management 
policy 
Expansion of exports as production rises; priority loans for enterprises 
whose exports exceed 3–8% of annual sales volume for passenger cars 
9 Localization policy  Prohibition of knock-down kits; preferential tax rates for enterprises with 
high localization rates 
10 Consumption and 
pricing policy 
Encouragement of individual ownership of automobiles; prices of civilian 
vehicles (except saloons) to be decided by enterprises according to market 
demand; prices of saloons to follow the state guide price 
11 Policies on related 
industries and social 
insurance 
Coordination and development of supporting industries (metals, materials, 
capital equipment, electronics, rubber, plastics, and glass); infrastructure 
development 
12 Industry policy 
planning and project 
management 
Localities and departments to support the Industry Policy; no new 
complete car facilities to be approved during 1994–95 
Source: The State Planning Committee of China (1994), “Automotive Industry Policy.” 
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Appendix B: Chinese Automotive Industry Policy 2004 
1 Policy objectives Insisting on the principle of combining market theory and government macro 
planning;  promotion of the harmonious development of the automotive and 
associated industries; driving industrial structural adjustment;  enhancing 
economy of scale and concentration of the industry; encouragement of self-
reliant product development and local brand development, aiming to build up a 
few famous brands and world-level (top 500) automotive groups before 2010; 
 to become one of the major global automotive production countries and to 
export in large volumes; fostering the development of local suppliers and 
encouraging the participation of global competition. 
2 Development 
planning 
management  
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) makes the mid- 
and long-term strategic plan for the industry in accordance with this policy; 
 the big automotive enterprises (with > 15% market share) should make 
strategic plans of their own in accordance with the strategic plan of NDRC 
with the authorization of NDRC. 
3 Technology 
policy 
Insisting on the principle of combining technology transfer and self-reliant 
product development;  encouragement of light-duty and fuel-efficient cars; 
 promotion of the R&D and commercialization of battery-powered electrical 
vehicles, hybrids, and fuel cell vehicles; promotion of the use of alternative 
fuels including methanol, ethanol, natural gas, etc. 
4 Industrial 
structure 
adjustment  
Encouragement of formation of big automotive groups (with > 15% market 
share) or alliance;  encouragement of global cooperation and operation of local 
automotive enterprises; encouragement of international acquisitions or 
mergers; separation of part divisions from assemblers; setting up regulations 
for withdrawing. 
5 Entry 
management 
To constitute “Bylaw of Motor Vehicle Management;”  to constitute 
compelling automotive product standard criteria for safety, emission, fuel 
efficiency, etc.;  to create uniform management systems for the entry of 
automotive enterprises and products. 
6 Brand strategy To encourage self-property products, emphasize intellectual property 
protection, and improve local brand reputation; encouragement of strategic 
planning on local brand development and protection; all the automotive parts 
and assemblies produced in China should be labeled with brands and 
production locations. 
7 Product 
development 
Encouragement and support of establishment of R&D centers in automotive 
enterprises for improving independent product innovation capabilities; 
 encourage the involvement of assemblers and suppliers in national R&D 
projects. 
8 Part industry Encouraging suppliers into the product development activities within 
assemblers;  to form advanced R&D and manufacturing capability and enter 
the international market; to encourage various sources of funds entering the 
parts industry. 
9 Distribution and 
sales network 
development 
Encouragement of learning mature international automotive sales modes; 
encouragement of the establishment of local brand product sales and service 
systems;  passenger car sales and service should be licensed from manufactures 
and distributed by brands by 2005, all autos by 2006. 
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10 Investment Chinese share holding in whole-car assembly enterprises must be no less than 
50% except for exportation-targeted projects; investment on establishing new 
automotive assembly enterprises must be no less than 2 billion Yuan. 
11 Import 
management 
Support localization of foreign products;  restriction of imports; entry points 
limited to four seaports and two land ports; prohibition of bonded service for 
imported automobiles in bonded areas of the import ports by 2005; prohibition 
of imports of used vehicles. 
12 Automotive 
consumption and 
use 
Encouragement of automobile credit consumption; improving automobile 
insurance policies; encouragement of well regulated used car circulation and 
transactions; encouragement of private car consumption;  prohibition of extra 
administration fees and government foundation raising; encouragement of 
light-duty, low-emission, and efficient cars.  Prohibition of discriminative 
policies on nonlocally produced automobile products; encouragement of 
private investments in parking lots and other infrastructure; constitute national 
uniform automotive emission standards; constitute a national uniform motor 
vehicle registration, inspection, and management system. 
Source: China National Development and Reform Commission (2004), “New Automotive Industry Policy.” 
